As the Richmond–Petersburg campaign (also known as the siege of Petersburg) ended, Lee's army was outnumbered and exhausted from a winter of trench warfare over an approximately 40 mi (64 km) front,[notes 1] numerous battles, disease, hunger and desertion.

[25] Lee wanted to move when local roads became passable as spring rains decreased and before Union reinforcements from Sheridan's cavalry from the Shenandoah Valley, recent new recruits for Grant's force, and possibly even men from Major General William T. Sherman's armies already operating in North Carolina, could arrive at Petersburg.

[notes 7][35][36][37] On March 22, 1865, Gordon told Lee he had determined that the best place to attack would be at Fort Stedman, east of Petersburg and south of the Appomattox River where the armies' lines were only about 200 yards apart.

[41] Grant ordered Major General Edward Ord, to quietly move units from the Army of the James to fill in the portion of the Petersburg line that the II Corps then occupied.

[45] On the same date, Sheridan's cavalry crossed the James River on a pontoon bridge at Deep Bottom in Henrico County, Virginia, 11 miles (18 km) southeast of Richmond.

[52] He also assured Sheridan that his force would participate in closing the war in the movements at Petersburg and that Grant gave him discretionary authority to go to North Carolina in his March 24 orders only in the event he needed it.

[56] In the brief but spirited skirmish, the Confederates retook McIlwaine's Hill with few casualties, but this was of minor consequence since Grant's plans for the March 29 offensive did not include an attack along the VI Corps picket line.

[29] Lee only had about 6,000 cavalrymen about 18 miles (29 km) south of Petersburg at Stony Creek Station and Major General George E. Pickett's division of about 5,000 effective infantrymen available to extend his lines.

[notes 10][41][65] Sheridan was told to move first to the rear of the V Corps and around their left flank to Dinwiddie Court House in an effort to outflank the Confederates and cut the Boydton Plank Road.

"Rooney" Lee's and Thomas L. Rosser's cavalry divisions to defend the western end of the line, including the important road junction of Five Forks in Dinwiddie County.

[96] During their discussions, Grant told Sheridan he would send him the V Corps for infantry support and that his new orders were not to extend the line further but to turn the Confederate flank and to break Lee's army.

[142] On March 30, 1865, in driving rain, Sheridan sent Union cavalry patrols from Brigadier General Thomas Devin's division to seize Five Forks, key junction for reaching the South Side Railroad.

Davies, Fitzhugh and Stagg brought their men back to Dinwiddie Court House about dark by a circuitous route cross country and by the Boydton Plank Road.

[191] With Sheridan fretting about the amount of remaining daylight and his cavalry possibly running out of ammunition,[192] the Union infantry forces attacked about 4:15 p.m.[193] Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee were having a late shad bake lunch about 1.5 miles (2.4 km) north of the main Confederate line along White Oak Road because they thought Sheridan was unlikely to be organized for an attack that late in the day and that General Lee would send reinforcements if Union Army infantry moved against them.

[226] The Union force took some casualties, including Brigadier General Lewis Grant of the 1st Vermont Brigade who suffered a severe head wound and had to relinquish command to Lieutenant Colonel Amasa S.

[250][251] Colonel William S. Truex led the rest of Seymour's division against two North Carolina regiments and a six-gun artillery battery on the far left of the VI Corps assault.

[263] After the breakthrough, Wright and his officers brought some order to seven brigades and turned this large part of his corps to the left to deal with the troops of Major General Henry Heth's division still holding the Confederate line to the southwest with about 1,600 men.

[286][287] After dealing with more artillery fire from across the Appomattox River, General Grant ordered the exhausted VI Corps troops to halt and rest, which they did after completing some fortifications near the Turnbull House.

[296] Union Colonel (Brevet Brigadier General) John I. Curtin's brigade assaulted the fort from the rear as well as across the ditch and over the parapet, capturing three guns and several prisoners but they could not advance due to flanking artillery fire.

[323] Cooke's men threw up a slender line of earthworks about 0.5 miles (0.80 km) long along Cox Road parallel to the railroad with an open field about 700 yards (640 m) with a slight slope in front.

[313] Heth had placed Cooke's men on favorable ground between Sutherland Tavern and Ocran Methodist Church with a refused left flank and sharpshooters deployed in front as skirmishers.

[332] Union troops of the XXV Corps of the Army of the James under Major General Godfrey Weitzel occupied Richmond and began to put out fires and restore order.

[350][354] Yet Union Army foragers, perhaps being less sensitive to the reluctance or needs of local residents, seemed to have been able to find abundant provisions on the march as their wagons began to fall far behind on the muddy roads.

[355] Some modern historians have emphasized the failure to have an expected pontoon bridge at the Genito Road crossing was the key factor in keeping Lee's trailing divisions from reaching Amelia Court House on April 4.

"[379] Upon returning to the scene near the end of the battle with Major General William Mahone's division, and from a bluff across Sailor's Creek seeing the disorganization on the field and survivors streaming along the road, Lee exclaimed "My God, has the army dissolved?

[384] During the morning of April 6, after being warned that Lee's Army was on the march, Ord and Gibbon had moved cautiously up the railroad and found Longstreet's force digging in near Rice's Station.

[386] With the Union Army nearby after the disastrous Confederate defeat at Sailor's Creek, under General Lee's order, Longstreet withdrew during the night towards Farmville, Virginia, where rations were waiting.

[notes 25] The Appomattox campaign was an example of masterful, relentless pursuit and maneuver by Grant and Sheridan, skills that had been in short supply by previous generals, such as Meade after Gettysburg and McClellan after Antietam.

National Park Service historian Chris M. Calkins estimates 6,266 killed and wounded, 19,132 captured; surrendering at Appomattox Court House were 22,349 infantry, 1,559 cavalry, and 2,576 artillery troops.

[410] William Marvel has written that many of the Confederate veterans bemoaned that there were only "8,000 muskets" available at the end against the enormous Union Army, but this figure deliberately ignores cavalry and artillery strength and is much lower than the total number of men who received certificates of parole.