Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986), was a United States Supreme Court case about the First Amendment and whether freedom of speech was violated by shutting down a bookstore because of illicit sexual activities occurring there.

The court held that the closure was aimed at nonexpressive activity and its incidental burden on speech was not subject to any First Amendment scrutiny.

An undercover deputy sheriff investigated the store and allegedly witnessed sexual activity and solicitation of prostitution on multiple occasions.

[1] The defendant argued that the forced closure of the bookstore would violate their First Amendment right to sell books and other materials, which are protected speech.

In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren Burger for a six-justice majority, the court held that no First Amendment scrutiny applied.

"[5] Otherwise, the bookseller's argument would be too far-reaching, because "every civil and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First Amendment protected activities.

[9][10] This distinguished two earlier cases: United States v. O'Brien (1968) and Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue (1983), respectively.

The court in Arcara found that, unlike Minneapolis Star, the effect of the statute was not to single out First Amendment protected activities.

"[14] Because the government had not shown that other means of stopping lewd activity were inadequate, the dissent concluded that closing the store unnecessarily restricted the bookseller's First Amendment rights.

Constitutional law scholar Wesley Jud Campbell wrote that, since Arcara, "the Court has mostly stopped applying First Amendment scrutiny to general (i.e., nontargeted) regulations of nonexpressive conduct".

In First Amendment scholar Geoffrey R. Stone's view, Albertini meant either that the two exceptions listed in Arcara were not exhaustive, or that "expressive" activity could be very broad.

"[22] Scholars looked for explanations beyond the Arcara rule to understand the court's case law about content-neutral and incidental restrictions on speech.

[26] Srinivasan argued that "speech-suppressive administrative motive rather than the degree of speech-restrictive effect" was the Supreme Court's main concern in the cases.

Chief Judge Sol Wachtler's unanimous opinion justified greater protection by referencing New York's "long history and tradition of fostering freedom of expression".