This is held as indirect evidence of God, given that notions about souls and the afterlife in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam would be consistent with such a claim.
[3] He uses the argument from personal identity[clarification needed] for mind-body dualism to show that we have a non-physical mental element to our minds.
Theists such as Robert Adams[5] have advanced a slightly different version of Swinburne's argument which focuses on mental/physical correlations and not merely the existence of mental states.
[2] Another Catholic philosopher, Edward Feser has promoted the Augustinian argument, including it in his book Five Proofs of the Existence of God.
[12] Moreland spends much of the book defending this premise against philosophers, such as Michael Martin, who accept pluralist naturalism.
He also critiques contemporary philosophers of mind such as John Searle, Timothy O' Connor, Colin McGinn, David Skriba, Philip Clayton and Jaegwon Kim, who attempt to account for consciousness.
Finally, one can also question premise eight: why does a personal explanation have to lead to monotheistic (as opposed to deistic or polytheistic) accounts of intention?
[13] However, Moreland maintains that questioning these minor premises is of little consolation to the naturalist as they essentially constitute intramural theist debates, and that for most westerners theism is the only viable candidate to accommodate personal explanations.