It was largely negotiated by General Louis Franchet d'Espèrey, as the commanding officer of the Allied Army of the Orient, and Hungarian Prime Minister Mihály Károlyi, on 7 November.

It was signed by General Paul Prosper Henrys and vojvoda Živojin Mišić, as representatives of the Allies, and by the former Hungarian Minister of War, Béla Linder.

The terms of the armistice and the subsequent actions of the Allies embittered a significant part of Hungary's population and caused the downfall of Károlyi and the First Hungarian Republic, which had been established only 3 days after its signing.

The Allied Army of the Orient, commanded by French General Louis Franchet d'Espèrey, rapidly advanced north as a result, recapturing ground that had been lost to the Central Powers in 1915.

By 1 November, the Serbian First Army under vojvoda Petar Bojović and the French Armée d'Orient, led by General Paul Prosper Henrys, reached Belgrade.

Once there, the troops stopped to rest, with only minimal forces deployed across the Danube and Sava rivers, which represented Serbia's pre-war border with Austria-Hungary.

[3] On 29 October, the Sabor of Croatia-Slavonia broke its legal ties with Austria-Hungary, and the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (comprising the South Slavic-inhabited Habsburg lands) became independent.

[7] The same day Bojović informed the Serbian Supreme Command that lieutenant colonels Koszlovány and Dormanti, attached to the Hungarian general staff, had reached the Dunav Division's headquarters on authority of Generalfeldmarschall Hermann Kövess von Kövessháza, with offers of an armistice.

This information was then forwarded to d'Espèrey, who provided the Chief-of-staff of the Serbian Supreme Command, vojvoda Živojin Mišić, with a list of six conditions to be demanded from Hungary before any negotiations could commence.

They included the disarmament and withdrawal of Hungarian forces from a zone extending 15 kilometres (9.3 miles) from the pre-war Serbian and Romanian borders, the surrender of all vessels on the Danube, Sava, and Drina rivers and in the Adriatic Sea, and the supply of a delegate authorised to discuss the terms of the armistice.

Mišić replied to d'Espèrey with a demand that Austro-Hungarian forces should evacuate from all territories reserved for a future South Slavic state, and requested that the Serbian Army be allowed to occupy the Banat and Bačka regions up to the Mureș–Baja–Subotica–Pécs line.

[8] In view of this development, Mišić directed Bojović to continue advancing north to capture Banat south of the Mureș River, and west of the line about 10 kilometres (6.2 miles) east of Bela Crkva, Vršac, and Timișoara.

Both the First and the Second armies were instructed in less precise terms to advance west to Syrmia, Slavonia, Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia; Serbian troops started heading towards these regions on 5 November.

[9] The same day, d'Espèrey learned of the armistice of Villa Giusti and sent a telegram to Paris asking if he should continue negotiations or simply apply the terms of the existing agreement to his area of responsibility.

He hoped the Triple Entente would by sympathetic to his government on account of his wartime declarations against the war and alliance with Germany – and perceive Hungary as a neutral, friendly nation.

[12] On 7 November, d'Espèrey arrived in Belgrade accompanied by the chief operating officer of the Serbian Supreme Command, Colonel Danilo Kalafatović.

This message was forwarded to Belgrade via Thessaloniki, Skopje and Niš where it was intercepted by the assistant Chief of Staff of the Serbian Supreme Command, Colonel Petar Pešić.

[18] In Thessaloniki, d'Espèrey urged the Romanian government to enter the war on the side of the Allies, and they complied – ordering mobilisation on 10 November and commencing hostilities the next day.

[19] After learning of the armistice of 11 November 1918 and that it applied to Hungary as well, Mišić again instructed Bojović to advance as far east in Banat as possible towards the Orșova–Lugoj– Timișoara line regardless of the presence of any Allied forces there.

The first specified the demarcation line running along the upper course of the Someș before turning to Bistrița, then south to the Mureș River and along its course to confluence with the Tisza from where it proceeded west to Subotica, Baja, and Pécs before reaching the Drava and the border with Croatia-Slavonia.

[22] Points four through six and eight determined the number of horses, rolling stock, ships, tugboats, and barges to be placed at the disposal of the Allied commander in Thessaloniki or as indemnity for Serbian war losses, as well as the supply of railway personnel for the same.

[24] Within 24 hours, Vix was sent orders to obtain Hungarian withdrawal from areas of present-day Slovakia, in violation of the armistice of Belgrade, to enforce a claim by Czechoslovakia directed through French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon.

[27] On 25 November, only days after the signing of the armistice, the Great People's Assembly of Serbs, Bunjevci and other Slavs in Banat, Bačka and Baranja was convened in Novi Sad to proclaim the unification of these regions with Serbia.

The first attempt to occupy Međimurje in mid-November failed, but a second incursion by the Royal Croatian Home Guard resulted in the region's occupation on behalf of the newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 24 December 1918.

[33] France urged the Army of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to move against the Hungarian Soviet Republic by advancing north from Bačka, but no such military intervention ever took place.

[38] From those territories, as well as those lost to Czechoslovakia and Austria, 350,000–400,000 refugees left or fled to Hungary, where subsequently, according to Hungarian author Paul Lendvai, they became receptive to extremist and populist views.