Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA
[3] A group of about 140 professionals (primarily biologists, but also including lawyers and physicians) participated in the conference to draw up voluntary guidelines to ensure the safety of recombinant DNA technology.
[4] Due to potential safety hazards, scientists worldwide had halted experiments using recombinant DNA technology, which entailed combining DNAs from different organisms.
During these decades, a tradition of merging the structural, biochemical and informational approaches to the central problems of classical genetics became more apparent.
These concepts were embodied in the model of DNA produced through the combined efforts of James Watson, Francis Crick, and Rosalind Franklin.
For these reasons, the other investigators feared that the final step would create cloned SV40 DNA that might escape into the environment and infect laboratory workers.
[8] Concern about this potential biohazard, along with others, caused a group of leading researchers to send a letter to the president of the National Academy of Science (NAS).
Low risk containment was appropriate for experiments that generated novel biotypes but where the available information indicated that the recombinant DNA could not either alter appreciably the ecological behavior of the recipient species, increase significantly its pathogenicity or prevent effective treatments of any resulting infections.
The moderate risk level of containment was intended for experiments in which there was a probability of generating an agent with a significant potential for pathogenicity or ecological disruption.
High-risk containment was intended for experiments in which the potential for ecological disruption or pathogenicity of the modified organism could be severe and thereby pose a serious biohazard to laboratory personnel or to the public.
However, unless the organism made a dangerous product, recombinant DNAs from cold-blooded vertebrates and all other lower eukaryotes could be constructed and propagated with the safest vector-host system available in low risk containment facilities.
Additionally, purified DNA from any source that performed known functions and was judged to be non-toxic could be cloned with available vectors in low risk containment facilities.
In addition, neither the cloning of DNA containing toxin genes, nor large scale experiments using recombinant DNAs that were able to make products that were potentially harmful to humans, animals or plants were allowed under the guidelines.
That scandal resulted from a bungled break-in at the Watergate hotel in Washington, D.D., which served as the Democratic National Committee headquarters in 1972.
[15] Additionally, according to Dr. Berg and Dr. Singer, by being forthright, scientists avoided restrictive legislation due to the development of a consensus on how they were to conduct their research.
[16] Bringing science into the public eye also coincided with the rapid rate at which recombinant DNA technology entered the industrial world.
In addition, many molecular biologists who once confined themselves to academia, developed ties with private industry as equity owners, corporate executives and consultants.
The guidelines devised by the conference enabled scientists to conduct experiments with recombinant DNA technology, which by 1995 dominated biological research.
