Much criticism has been made of the British attacks as uncoordinated, tactically crude and wasteful of manpower, which gave the Germans an opportunity to concentrate their inferior resources on narrow fronts.

The Chief of the German General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, intended to split the British and French alliance in 1916 and end the war, before the Central Powers were crushed by Allied material superiority.

The inherent difficulties of coalition warfare were made worse by the German defensive effort and several downpours of rain, which turned the ground to mud and filled shell-holes with water, making movement difficult, even in areas not under fire.

British and French aircraft prevented German air observation and ammunition was moved forward night and day, over ground so damaged and waterlogged, that it took five or six hours to make a round-trip.

[35] On 6 July, BEF headquarters laid down a policy that British numerical superiority was to be used to exploit German disorganisation and diminished morale, by boldly following up the success south of the Albert–Bapaume road.

[46] The advance of I Colonial Corps created a salient and German artillery, safe on the east bank of the Somme and assisted by more aircraft and observation balloons, could enfilade the defences hurriedly built by French troops and make movement on the Flaucourt Plateau impossible in daylight.

The German artillery around Flaucourt was abandoned and French cavalry probed towards the river, a total advance of 4.3 mi (7 km), the deepest penetration since trench warfare began.

[51] The 2nd Colonial Division (General Emile-Alexis Mazillier) advanced beyond Feuillères and occupied ground overlooking the boucle, (loop) formed by the sharp turn north-west of the Somme at Péronne.

[46] Hem and high ground to the north, behind defences 1,600 yd (1,500 m) deep back to Monacu Farm, were attacked by the 11th Division, which had been organised to advance in depth, with moppers-up wearing markings to distinguish their role.

[54] Due to a lack of roads, Foch was not able to supply enough reinforcements on the north bank for an advance towards Maurepas, until British troops had captured the German second position from Longueval to Bazentin le Petit and were poised to attack Guillemont; XX Corps was ordered conduct counter-battery fire in the meantime.

[58] Rain fell overnight and heavy showers on 4 July lasted all afternoon, flooding trenches and grounding RFC aircraft, apart from a few flights to reconnoitre Mametz Wood.

On the left, bombers of the 19th (Western) Division skirmished all day and at 6:00 p.m., a warning from an observer in a reconnaissance aircraft led to the ambush of German troops advancing towards Bailiff Wood who were stopped by small-arms fire.

The attack moved forward in four waves, with mopping-up parties following, through much return fire from the garrison and reached a trench at the edge of the village, forcing the survivors to retreat into Contalmaison.

The attack was cancelled but some German troops managed to get across to the wood to reinforce the garrison, as part of a British battalion advanced from the south, retook the south-eastern edge and dug in.

[85] The divisions of X Corps continued the attack on Ovillers, making slow progress against determined German defenders, who took advantage of the maze of ruins, trenches, dug-outs and shell-holes, to keep close British positions and avoid artillery-fire, which passed beyond them.

[90] Some of the German air units had recently arrived from Russia and lacked experience of Western Front conditions, some aircraft were being replaced and many single-seat fighter pilots were newly trained.

In the evening, a large column of German troops was seen near Bazentin le Grand and machine-gunned from the air and the British advance to the southern fringe of Contalmaison was observed and reported.

[108] Pannewitz had been allowed to withdraw by Below, which led Falkenhayn to sack Below's Chief of Staff General Grünert and order that "the first principle in position warfare must be to yield not one foot of ground and if it be lost to retake it by immediate counter-attack, even to the use of the last man".

[109][i] At 4:40 p.m. the French resumed the attack, captured Frise and overran the two battalions of the XVII Corps and a regiment of the 22nd Reserve Division in the second position, Herbécourt falling in thirty minutes.

[109] On 6–7 July from Foucaucourt to the Albert–Bapaume road, losses among the German infantry increased rapidly, one crisis merged into the next and the policy of unyielding defence and immediate counter-attack exposed the defenders to British–French firepower.

[117] Falkenhayn urged Below to use his reserves to defend the position between Hardecourt and Trônes Wood, as it was an area from which the British and French lines could be enfiladed, should a counter-attack be attempted, although Below favoured an attack on the south bank, where it was easier to concentrate artillery.

[121] In 2005, Prior and Wilson contradicted a version of the "traditional" narrative of the First Day of the Somme, which had been established in the writings of John Buchan, Basil Liddell Hart, Charles Cruttwell, Martin Middlebrook, Correlli Barnett and many others.

Prior and Wilson wrote that the Germans should have slowly withdrawn to straighten the line and conserve manpower, rather than sacking staff officers for the withdrawal of 2 July and issuing a no-retreat order.

[126] In 2006, Jack Sheldon called the officers sacked by Falkenhayn scapegoats; the survivors of the attacks of 1 July had to hang on until reserves arrived, who suffered many casualties when they were rushed to the most threatened areas.

[129] In 2007, Christopher Duffy wrote that the British losses on 1 July 1916 were greater than those of the Crimean, Boer and Korean wars combined and that the "unique volunteer culture" of the Pals battalions died with their men.

[45] The French XX Corps on the north bank was held back as the troops on either side pressed forward, the British managing a small advance at La Boisselle.

[46] Philpott wrote that the meeting between Joffre, Haig and Foch on 3 July was far less cordial than in other accounts but that over the next day a compromise was agreed, that the British would transfer their main effort south of the Albert–Bapaume road.

[134] The crisis in the French defence of Verdun had been overcome, with a relaxation of German pressure on 24 June and a "strict defensive" imposed by Falkenhayn on 12 July after the failure at Fort Souville.

The French had attacked cautiously, behind a wall of heavy artillery-fire and achieved their objectives with minimal casualties; Harris wrote that Haig could easily have adopted a similar approach.

Flights over Landrecies and Le Cateau found no unusual rail movements but on 7 July many trains were seen on the lines from Cambrai and Bapaume to Roisel, which indicated that troops were being moved to the south bank of the Somme.