[6] Gilbert Clayton had already told Lawrence, "The move to Aqaba on the part of Feisal is not at present desirable..." This was due to the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence being superseded by the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

"[7]: 257–58 The 600-mile desert journey was led by Sherif Nasir, while Lawrence was accompanied by Nesib el-Bekri and Auda Abu Tayi, leader of the northern Howeitat tribe of Bedouin.

"[8] Newcombe and Lawrence contrived to deceive the Turkish army that their objective was an attack on Damascus and Aleppo, drawing attention away from their real goal of Aqaba.

While in Bair, Lawrence and Auda decided to attack the rail line in the area of Daraa, to convince the Turks the main Arab force was at Azrak in Sirhan.

Finding no suitable targets that far north, Lawrence and Zaal ended up attacking the Atwi station south of Amman, before returning to Bair.

Auda established an advance post at Guweira with 600 of his clan, which they held for the next month and a half, enough time for the gain of Aqaba to be consolidated, even though the Ottomans were able to retake Abu al-Lissan and Fuweilah.

At Ismailia Station, Lawrence convinced Burmester and Admiral Wemyss to send HMIS Dufferin to Aqaba with food, bringing back the prisoners on the return trip.

Allenby promised Lawrence to do what he could, and subsequently told Robertson, "...even the partial success of Captain Lawrence's scheme would seriously disorganise Turkish railway communications south of Aleppo, while its complete success would destroy effectively his only main artery of communication..."[7]: 280 [8]: 315–21 Aqaba became a major Royal Navy depot, supplying and transporting Feisal's forces upon his arrival on 23 August, as HMS Euryalus and then HMS Humber guarded the port.

A landing strip was built at Kuntilla; and by August 4 the Royal Flying Corps was bombing Maan, Abu al-Lissan, and Fuweilah, supplementing continued attacks by Auda on the Hejaz railway.