At the end of the battle, the town of Chorrillos was burnt to the ground by the Chilean army trying to eradicate the Peruvian defenders garrisoned there.

Despite this result, another battle had to be fought in order that the Chilean army could enter the Peruvian capital city at Miraflores, two days later.

[4] This political and social climate forced both the Chilean government and its high command to plan a new campaign with the objective to obtain an unconditional capitulation at the Peruvian capital city.

Since it became obvious the attack would come from the south, a long line of defenses was set at Chorrillos and Miraflores, under the advisement of the engineers Gorbitz and Arancibia.

The line of Chorrillos was 15 kilometres long, lying from Marcavilca hill to La Chira, passing through the acclivities of San Juan and Santa Teresa.

A detachment of ninety horsemen of the Cazadores a Caballo Cavalry Regiment, led by Lt. Col. Ambrosio Letelier scouted the terrain until they reached Lurin, finding no presence of Peruvian troops.

On 24 December, a small vanguard force formed by four infantry companies and 200 Cazadores marched to Manchay, from where it went to Pachacamac, in order to protect the bridge there.

With the arrival of Lynch's brigade, the entire Chilean army gathered about 29,935 soldiers, organized into four divisions by the War Minister José Fco.

[5] Two companies of the Curico Infantry Regiment with 300 artillery men were left here taking care of the wounded generated by the march of part of the Chilean troops.

Pierola ordered the farmers of the Lima Department to form a mobile column and beset the Chilean forces landed in any way they could, and to serve as scouts.

Their emplacements were strengthened by a system of trenches for shooters on the hill slopes and hidden devices such as land mines and booby traps, which were poorly installed and did not really work.

[5] The Nº 9 "Callao" Battalion on the Villa sector was pushed back to Col. Iglesias' I Army Corps, which was also forced to retreat to new positions at Marcavilca.

Barbosa's brigade attacked the Peruvian trenches from the south, forcing Davila's Army Corps to retreat from San Juan.

Despite this, both regiments reached to Pampa de Tebes, but here were stopped by a Peruvian cavalry brigade sent by Silva and an intense infantry fire of the retiring battalions.

With the Peruvian line broken now at its center and beginning to collapse, Lagos’ III Division were sent from the Chilean right wing to support Lynch's forces which were sustaining heavy damage.

Sotomayor's division, along with Urriola's brigade attacked the town; meanwhile Barcelo marched to Morro Solar in order to take Panizo's position.

Prior to the occupation of Lima there were fires and sackings by demoralized Peruvian soldiers in the towns of Chorrillos and Barranco; as quoted by Charles de Varigny rendía incondicionalmente.

As Heraclio Bonilla has observed; Peruvian oligarchs soon came to fear the popular clashes more than the Chileans, and this was an important reason why they sued for peace.

Colonel Andrés Avelino Cáceres requested permission to attack the drunken soldiers in the night and save the remains of the population since, as he claimed, most of Chilean troops had scattered and were mutinied and not obeying their officers.

Besides, the Paucarpata, Jauja, Ancash, Concepción, Piura, 23 de Diciembre and Unión battalions had abundant losses.

The survivors refolded to strengthen Lima's second defensive line at Miraflores, but the defeat had an impact in the Peruvian morale.