After several failed attempts to take the settlements in 1986, eight FAPLA brigades mustered for a final offensive—Operação Saludando Octubre—in August 1987 with extensive auxiliary support from the Soviet Union.

[17] Once Mavinga was in its hands, FAPLA intended to expel the remaining insurgents from Moxico Province and pave the way for a final assault on the UNITA headquarters at Jamba.

[21][22] During the second phase of the campaign, the SADF and UNITA made several unsuccessful attempts to encircle and destroy the surviving FAPLA forces before they could establish new defensive positions east of Cuito Cuanavale, an initiative known as Operation Hooper.

[26][27] The Cuban and FAPLA defenders had interpreted the SADF's Tumpo Triangle campaign as part of a larger effort to seize the town of Cuito Cuanavale itself and presented their stand there as a successful defensive action.

[25] The SADF claimed that it had achieved its basic objectives of halting the FAPLA offensive during the Lomba River campaign without needing to occupy Cuito Cuanavale, which would have entailed unacceptable losses to its expeditionary force.

[28][29][20] Today, the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale is credited by some with ushering in the first round of trilateral negotiations, mediated by the United States, which secured the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola and Namibia by 1991.

Fighting between the three rebel factions started soon after the transitional government took office on 31 January 1975, with each movement gaining control of their traditional areas of influence by mid-1975: the MPLA in the capital and central Angola, the FNLA in the north and UNITA in the south.

[4][40] Combat operations were directed by Lieutenant General Petr Gusev, head of the Soviet military mission in Angola, nominally with the oversight of the Angolan Ministry of Defence.

[44] Gusev and Ryabchenko had also planned Operation Saluting October based on their experiences moving similarly sized units in the Soviet Union, and had failed to take into account the logistical disadvantages and technical shortcomings of the FAPLA forces involved.

[45] The brigades involved in the offensive advanced cautiously, covering just under 4 kilometres a day, and ceased all other activity in the late afternoon to construct elaborate defensive works.

[50] In August FAPLA's 16th, 21st (both light infantry), 47th (armoured) and 59th (mechanized) brigades, about 6,000 men and 80 tanks plus artillery and support vehicles, departed from Cuito Cuanavale to cross the Lomba River.

[6] General Arnaldo Ochoa, a veteran of the Ogaden War and then senior Cuban military officer in Angola, reported that the situation in the vicinity of the Cuito River "has continue to deteriorate...if the morale and fighting capacity of the [FAPLA] units are not reestablished, a catastrophe is inevitable.

"[6] Cuban President Fidel Castro subsequently met with top members of the general staff in Havana to discuss, in his own words, "the desperate requests of the Angolan government and the Soviet military mission that we send our troops to that remote place, to wage a battle on terrain chosen by the enemy.

[6] Soviet Minister of Defence Dmitry Yazov complained that the Cuban decision to commit combat troops was belated, suggesting that Operation Saluting October could have succeeded had they been involved in the offensive from the beginning.

[6] However, Soviet chief of general staff Sergey Akhromeyev privately conceded to Cuban officials that there were errors made in the operational planning that doomed the offensive.

[6] Akhromeyev was instrumental in approving Soviet logistical support for the movement of FAR combat forces to Cuito Cunavale, and in return, was kept closely updated on the tactical situation by his Cuban counterparts.

[6] Most Soviet advisers attached to FAPLA on the brigade level were also not withdrawn from Cuito Cuanavale after the arrival of the Cuban troops, and continued to carry out their routine duties for the duration of the campaign.

These tensions were to have repercussions both during the war where Castro's interference with defence plans may have cost the Cubans dozens of lives[70] and in the aftermath of Angolan hostilities a year later when Ochoa was arrested, tried and executed by firing squad after being found guilty of treason.

A large Cuban and FAPLA column was on the way from Menongue for the relief of Cuito Cuanavale, but progress in the rainy season was slow due to the need to clear the UNITA minefields and guard against possible ambushes.

[86][87] Fresh troops and equipment were brought in, designated 82 Mechanised brigade of the 7th South African Infantry Division, and yet another attempt was made on 23 March to drive the FAPLA back across the bridge.

The Cubans did however succeed in establishing air superiority over the area with their new Soviet aircraft, and the defenders did manage to hold onto a bridgehead east of the town, with the aid of extensive minefields.

[101] The South Africans were hampered by United Nations Security Council Resolution 418, an international arms embargo that prevented them from acquiring material such as modern aircraft.

Following the battles the South Africans recognised that further confrontation with the Cubans would unnecessarily escalate the conflict and with all risks considered then retired the combat groups still operating in Angola back to Namibia.

[4] Retired South African Brigadier General Dick Lord subsequently wrote that at least 40 SADF and SWATF personnel died during the Cuito Cuanavale campaign.

UNITA and its South African allies declared victory because the initial FAPLA offensive had been shattered and the participating enemy brigades had suffered heavy losses.

Fidel Castro claimed that "the overwhelming victory at Cuito Cuanavale...put an end to outside military aggression against [Angola]," asserting that South Africa had suffered such a catastrophic setback as a result of the battle that it "had to swallow its usual arrogant bullying and sit down at the negotiating table".

[111] However, Gourgoumis also found that the SADF campaign achieved one of South Africa's major diplomatic objectives by applying renewed pressure on the Soviet, Angolan, and Cuban governments to seek a negotiated end to the conflict.

[111] American historian Daniel Spikes commented that the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale exhausted both sides equally, and resulted in a "simmering stasis of frustrating, dead-end stalemate.

[112] While acknowledging that the final SADF and UNITA offensives were unsuccessful, Jeffrey Herbst, a political scientist at Princeton University, remarked: However, despite the claims of many that the [FAPLA and Cuban] defense was a striking victory, Cuito Cuanavale was not a defeat of the South Africans.

[45]A summary of the battle in Krasnaya Zvezda, the official periodical of the Soviet Ministry of Defence, noted that the FAPLA-Cuban coalition had failed to "decisively defeat the enemy" and described the result as "frankly speaking, an impasse".