Secretary of State for India, Austen Chamberlain was concerned that even if Baghdad could be captured, it would only be lost again because no other troops were available to reinforce Force "D".

[5] The Ottoman Sixth Army, reinforced, pursued and laid siege to the town after attempts to storm the Anglo-Indian positions failed.

Failing to take the town by storm, the Ottoman Sixth Army had adopted a passive siege, preferring to starve the Kut defenders into submission.

With the Poona Division under siege, the high commands in London and Simla began scrambling to put together a relief force.

[7] The Tigris Corps' first drive to relieve Townshend and the Kut garrison ground to a halt at the Battle of Hanna on 21 January 1916.

Following the setbacks at the Hanna on 21 January 1916, Lieutenant-General Aylmer's Tigris Corps spent the month of February refitting and collecting reinforcements.

Food stocks were estimated to last only until the middle of April, even with the discovery of an additional store of grain in late January.

Unwilling to leave the Tigris, which provided the British forces with an easy line of communication to Basra, Lieutenant-General Aylmer made the decision to attempt an advance along the right bank.

Since there was no way to cover a move across the river and through the Dujaila position, Aylmer and his staff put together a plan that called for a night assault by the majority of his force while a detachment would remain behind on the left bank as a diversion.

After the Battle of the Hanna, General Lake had begun to lose faith in Aylmer's abilities as commander of the Tigris Corps.

In order to exert greater control over the coming battle, he had replaced Aylmer's chief of staff with his own man, Major-General George Gorringe.

[15] Major-General Younghusband, who had been the chief proponent of a desert march to outflank the Ottoman lines entirely, was assigned to command the diversion force on the left bank.

The lack of any sort of industrial infrastructure (i.e. paved road capable of military transport or railways) made it exceedingly difficult for the Sixth Army to be rapidly reinforced.

Because Townshend had adopted a passive defensive stance, even more so since losing his ability to cross the river with the destruction of the pontoon bridge from Kut to the Woolpress village, his Ottoman army counterpart had been able to shift more and more of his troops south.

With Townshend's passivity, Field Marshal Von Der Goltz was able to move the bulk of his forces south, leaving only about 2,000 men to maintain the siege itself.

Realizing that the British might try to break the siege by advancing on the right bank, the Ottoman commander ordered the construction of the Dujaila redoubt.

Aylmer later testified he chose to attack on the right bank because although the redoubt was sited atop the Dujaila depression, construction had only begun a few days after the Hanna battle in January 1916.

[17] By the time of the assault, the Ottomans had significantly improved the position, complete with a glacis estimated to be 25 feet high in some places.

The lead elements of 26th Punjabis (part of 36th Indian Brigade attached to Column A) pushed forward, entering the Dujalia position to find them occupied only by a few unsuspecting soldiers.

[22] By the end of the battle, nearly 8,000 men were ferried across the river and brought into fighting positions, effectively doubling the strength of the Ottoman garrison on the right bank.

[22] Through the day, the Anglo-Indian battalions assaulted the Ottoman positions, only to be pinned down and driven back by machine gun and artillery fire.

Despite the missed opportunities, the fresh reinforcements, and the strong defensive entrenchments, by late afternoon, the British once again were on the verge of a breakthrough.

59th Scinde Rifles (Frontier Force) and 1st Manchester Regiment of the 8th (Jullundur) Brigade succeeded in capturing the first two lines of trenches of the Dujalia Redoubt.

Slowly but surely, the Ottoman battalions counter-attacked with bayonets and grenades, which were in short supply on the British side, forcing the Manchester's and Rifles to retreat in the early evening.

When word of the defeat at Dujalia was announced to 6th (Poona) Division, Indian Muslim soldiers, already conflicted about fighting their coreligionists, began to desert.