On 9 September the British began a bombardment early in the morning but waited until late afternoon to advance, to deny the Germans time to counter-attack before dark.

The assaults were sequenced with attacks by the Tenth and Reserve armies in September, which captured much more ground and inflicted approximately 130,000 casualties on the German defenders.

Anglo-French attempts to co-ordinate their attacks had failed from July to early September, due to a combination of disagreements between Haig, Joffre and Foch over tactics, supply difficulties, devastated terrain, inclement weather and the increasing defensive power of the German armies.

On the right flank the British line formed a salient at Longueval and Delville Wood, which ran west to Pozières and south to Maltz Horn Farm, the junction with the French Sixth Army.

[7] (British spy networks in northern France and Flanders had been blown in June 1916, which left the Secret Service and GHQ Intelligence ignorant of German troop movements in the area.

The "wearing-out" battles since late July and events elsewhere, led to a belief that the big Allied attack planned for mid-September could have decisive effect.

The outpost line, containing two or three soldiers every 20 yd (18 m) and the occasional machine-gun was often overrun, after which similar shell-hole positions were improvised by the British before a German counter-attack could be mounted.

[20][c] On the left I Corps occupied high ground south of Combles and entered Bois Douage, taking 2,000 prisoners and twelve guns.

When the British took Falfemont Farm on 5 September, the French gained touch at the Combles ravine and patrols captured Ferme de l'Hôpital, 880 yd (800 m) east of Le Forêt.

The bombers advanced towards Hop Alley at 11:55 a.m. but smoke from their fumite grenades alerted the Germans and the 24th Division battalion attacked late, after it received contradictory orders.

The eastern edge of Delville Wood up to Hop Alley was captured but the German defenders pinned down the rest of the attacking force, when it tried to advance by moving in the open and by bombing along trenches.

A supporting company got a few men into the orchards north-west of Ginchy and were joined by part of another battalion, originally intended to occupy Ale Alley as a defensive flank.

[23] Germans in the north end of the village then worked round the open left flank and counter-attacked, pushing the survivors back to Porter Trench, except for a party which held on to a position on the Guillemont road, at the boundary with XIV Corps.

The 7th Division called on corps headquarters for another bombardment by heavy artillery at 6:50 p.m. and the divisional commander Major-General Herbert Watts, requested the use of the 20th Brigade for another attack.

[24] Lieutenant-General Henry Horne, the corps commander referred this to Fourth Army headquarters, because the brigade was being conserved for the big attack planned for mid-September.

[26] On the right of XIV Corps, the 56th (1/1st London) Division attacked on 9 September at 4:45 p.m. A battalion of the 169th Brigade advanced from the south-east of Leuze Wood towards Loop Trench, to establish a defensive flank along the Combles ravine.

Air reconnaissance of the Quadrilateral which lay in dead ground, had shown that its outer belt of barbed-wire had been cut by the British artillery but not wire covered by long grass for 60 yd (55 m) behind.

The brigade advanced either side of the Guillemont–Ginchy road, against slight opposition and reached the first objective along Hans Crescent, on the western outskirts of Ginchy at 5:00 p.m. Two battalions leap-frogged through at 5:25 p.m. and took the village and 200 German prisoners, the rest withdrawing towards Flers and Lesbœufs.

[32] On the right of XV Corps, an attack by 164th Brigade of the 55th Division captured the east end of Delville Wood and took Hop and Ale alleys but failed to hold them against German artillery and machine-gun fire.

[37] Another aircraft flight took place during the attack and observed British infantry enter the village at 1:00 p.m., then saw the advance move through the centre of Ginchy towards the eastern edge.

[39] A British attack at 8:00 a.m. was repulsed by small-arms fire, after signals to the German artillery went unanswered and I Battalion, F R 35 had many casualties defending Delville Wood to the west.

[40] On 8 September, the men of I Battalion, I R 88 at the Entenschnabel (Duck's Bill), a former meadow in the area between Delville Wood and Ginchy, were subjected to Trommelfeuer (drumfire) which sent plumes of mud high into the air.

Opposite Delville Wood, the British attack was defeated but a company in Ginchy was rolled up from the south and part of II Battalion was also pushed back.

The hurried relief of the defenders and lack of organisation at the divisional boundary, enabled a British battalion to find its way in small groups through a gap between German units and get round the flank of the 5th Bavarian Division, forcing it to withdraw.

On 11 September, Gallwitz wrote that if the process continued, Germany would run out of men and equipment and that the British heavy guns were destroying the German artillery.

[46] Prior & Wilson wrote that Guillemont had eventually been captured, using improved tactics but that the 7th Division attacked Ginchy with insufficient weight, seeking to keep troops fresh for the big offensive planned for mid-September.

Atkinson claimed that fighting for the village covered the left flank of the troops further south attacking Guillemont and absorbed German reinforcements in the area.

[48] J. P. Harris described British efforts between 15 July and 14 September, a "dissolution" and that the large number of piecemeal attacks demonstrate a failure of command, primarily by Haig.

[51] In contrast to the criticism from Joffre and Foch at the time and by writers and historians since, that the British in this period conducted too many narrow-front attacks, which conceded a tactical advantage to the Germans, Dudley Ward in the 56th (1/1st London) Division history, noted that broad-front attacks were futile when delivered with insufficient weight, since troops edged away from return fire and moved through gaps in defences, bypassing German infantry who could cut them off from reinforcements and supplies.

Next day the 56th (1/1st London) Division attacked south-east from Leuze Wood at 7:00 a.m. but was stopped by machine-gun fire from Loop Trench and the sunken road into Combles; a second attempt at 3:00 p.m. also failed.