Yuan Shao held control of the lands north of the Yellow River, namely the Hebei region, while Cao Cao controlled most of the lands south of the Yellow River after he defeated Lü Bu at the Battle of Xiapi in 199 and kept Emperor Xian with him in the new capital city of Xu.

It was near Yan Ford (延津; north of present-day Yanjin County, Henan) on the Yellow River and lay on the road leading to the capital city Xu.

Yuan Shao tried to use the opportunity to start a campaign south, but was daunted by Yu Jin, the defender of Yan Ford.

Yuan Shao ignored Tian Feng's repeated remonstrations and imprisoned him under charges of demoralizing the army.

Shortly after, Yuan Shao had Chen Lin draft a document condemning Cao Cao in what was essentially a declaration of war, and marched his main army toward the forward base of Liyang (黎陽; northwest of present-day Xun County, Henan) north of the river.

In the ensuing battle, Yan Liang was killed by Guan Yu and Yuan Shao's army was routed.

Having lost two of their generals in these relatively minor skirmishes prior to the primary conflict at Guandu resulted in a crushing blow to the morale of Yuan Shao's army.

After the engagements at the river, Yuan Shao's army pushed to Yangwu (陽武; near present-day Yuanyang County, Henan), directly north of Guandu, and began constructing earthen fortifications.

He ignored Cheng Yu's bastion of 700 men at Juancheng and missed an opportunity to attack Cao Cao's eastern flank,[2] exactly as Cheng Yu's predicted earlier when he guessed that Yuan Shao would ignore a position with so few men.

Yuan Shao's Attendant Officer (從事) Ju Shou had reservations about concentrating all of the main army at Yangwu, and suggested leaving a garrison at Yan Ford as a precaution in case the attack on Guandu did not go well.

Ju Shou, in despair, tried to excuse himself by claiming to be ill, but Yuan Shao became annoyed at him and would not grant him leave.

Cao Ren again responded to the threat by defeating Han Meng at Mount Jiluo (雞洛山; 50 li northeast of present-day Xinmi, Henan).

He wrote, drawing historical examples from the Chu–Han Contention: ...your military supplies are low, but they are not as bad as the situation of Chu and Han at Xingyang and Chenggao.

You, Duke, with one-tenth of the enemy's force you have held the ground you marked, and gripping him by the throat, have not let him advance for already half a year.

In the ninth month,[5] Xun Yu pointed out that Yuan Shao had been storing supplies at a depot in the village of Gushi (故市; southwest of present-day Yanjin County, Henan), guarded by Han Meng.

They succeeded, routing Han Meng, disrupting Yuan Shao's supply lines, and burning his grain carts.

In the tenth month, Yuan Shao's general Chunyu Qiong returned with an army of 10,000 from Hebei escorting large reserves of food supplies.

Yuan Shao's advisor Ju Shou argued that Wuchao, being their important supply depot, was too lightly guarded and insisted that Yuan Shao should send the general Jiang Qi (蔣奇) to serve as a perimeter guard to Chunyu Qiong and cut off any potential raids.

Yuan Shao's officers Lü Weihuang (呂威璜), Han Juzi (韓莒子), Sui Yuanjin (眭元進), and Zhao Rui (趙叡) were decapitated; Chunyu Qiong was captured by Yue Jin and had his nose cut off.

By dawn, Wuchao had turned into an inferno and the morale of Yuan Shao's army plummeted sharply due to the loss of food supplies.

Meanwhile, at Guandu, Yuan Shao's army led by Zhang He and Gao Lan failed to break through the enemy lines.

Affected by the news of the defeat in Wuchao and rumors of Guo Tu making slanderous remarks about them, Zhang He and Gao Lan surrendered to Cao Hong and destroyed their weapons.

Order was restored only when Yuan Shao reached the camp of his general Jiang Yiqu (蔣義渠), from where he gathered his straggling troops.

The Song dynasty historian Sima Guang, compiler of the chronicle Zizhi Tongjian, remarked that while Yuan Shao was generous, elegant and able, he was also obstinate, self-satisfied, and seldom heeded reasonable advice.

[7] In more recent times, both the Chinese Nationalists and Communists have picked up on this battle and made their own interpretations, in various degrees of objectivity.

The Nationalists followed traditional Chinese historiography in that they judged the battle in terms of personalities, rather than the situations and the tactics involved.

In all of these battles, he wrote, "...the contestants were unequal in strength, and the weaker one yielding a step at first, pinned down the stronger one through delayed action and defeated him.