[1] Attempts were made by Joseph Joffre, the French supreme commander, Sir Douglas Haig, Ferdinand Foch and the army commanders Henry Rawlinson and Émile Fayolle to co-ordinate attacks, which failed due to the recovery of the German 2nd Army from the disorganisation caused by the defeats in early July, disagreements over tactics by Haig and Joffre in July and August and organisational constraints caused by congestion behind the front, roads and tracks obliterated by Anglo-French artillery-fire becoming swamps when it rained.

Increasing German artillery-fire on targets behind the front line, inexperience, unreliable machinery, guns, ammunition and an unpredictable flow of supplies from Britain, reduced the effectiveness of the British armies.

[2][a] The German 2nd Army abandoned the second line on the south bank in the XVII Corps area, to occupy the shorter third position behind it close to Péronne, despite the policy of an unyielding defence.

[3][b] Next day Below issued a secret order that ground must be held at all costs, defensive positions were to be recovered by counter-attacks and that all commanders must make it clear that "The enemy must be made to pick his way forward over corpses".

Over the next ten days, fifteen fresh divisions were sent to the Somme front, being split up as they arrived and used piecemeal to fill gaps at the most vulnerable points, which led to many casualties in the reinforcing units.

On 2 August, Haig issued a directive stating that Falkenhayn could continue to replace troops on the Somme and a German collapse was not expected, forecasting a "wearing-out" battle until September.

Congestion of the railways began to affect operations in July and rainy periods made delivery of ammunition from railheads to gun positions much harder, when 550 lorry-loads were being delivered even on quiet days.

Lack of reserves was the chief difficulty of the defence and Loßberg urged Falkenhayn to end the Battle of Verdun to supply reinforcements; for as long as German attacks continued at Verdun, troops, supplies and equipment arrived on the Somme intermittently, forcing piecemeal reinforcement of weak spots by battalions and companies, rather than complete units from a settled echelon of reserves, which caused irreplaceable losses in divisions kept in the line for too long.

Allied attacks on limited objectives reduced the effectiveness of German defensive dispersal, positions were incessantly bombarded, trenches, barbed wire and dugouts disappearing as far back as the second line.

Trenches were evacuated before attacks, which began the development of defended areas, in which small groups manoeuvred to deprive Allied gunners of recognisable targets, vastly inflating the amount of ammunition necessary for bombardments.

[23] The French Sixth Army was reinforced by another corps on the north bank and captured documents were circulated, which revealed that the German defence had been instructed to occupy the front line with fewer troops and place units in echelon and depth for local counter-attacks, to exploit surprise and use engineers offensively.

[35] The Fourth Army artillery began to register targets (firing ranging shots) on 21 July but poor visibility, made aircraft observation impossible at times.

[39][e] The attack differed little from previous attempts, although careful briefings were conducted and elaborate measures taken to maintain communication, using contact-patrol aircraft to observe ground flares, mirrors, lamps and panels.

Rawlinson and Fayolle agreed a preliminary attack for 16 August, from Angle Wood to south of Guillemont, which took place in hot weather, with special arrangements for counter-battery fire and communication.

Heavy rain began to fall on 25 August and turned the ground into a swamp, preventing the digging of assembly trenches, blocking routes to the front line and severely slowing the flow of supplies.

The Germans also gained an advantage, from being forced back, as the area most devastated by artillery-fire grew wider and was on the Allied side, which created chronic problems in transporting supplies to the front line, periodically made worse by downpours, which turned roads and tracks into glissades of mud.

Control of the creeping barrage was delegated to commanders closer to the battle and a communications system using flares, Roman candles, flags and panels, telephones, optical signals, pigeons and message runners was set up to maintain contact with the front line.

Transport difficulties became so bad that Guillaumat ordered all stranded vehicles to be thrown off the roads and to move in daylight, despite German artillery-fire, ready for the resumption of attacks on 12 September.

A second line of defence ran from Chaulnes (behind woods to the west and north and the château park, from which the Germans had observation over the ground south of the Flaucourt plateau), Pressoir, Ablaincourt, Mazancourt and Villers-Carbonnel.

[60] The attack took place from Chilly on the right flank to Barleux on the left, to gain ground on the Santerre plateau, ready to exploit a possible German collapse and capture crossings over the Somme south of Péronne.

[63] The left-hand battalion got lost in the gloom and smoke blown over Guillemont, some troops veered right and met uncut wire south-east of the village, before falling back to Trônes Wood.

At dawn, fog rose and visibility fell below 40 yd (37 m); Maltz Horn Farm and trenches nearby, were stormed at zero hour, by a British battalion from the west and part of the French 153rd Division from the south.

[65] Communication with the rear broke down again, as German artillery-fire cut telephone wires and visual signalling was obstructed by the fog, until about 9:00 a.m. Pigeons and runners carried a few messages and at 8:55 a.m., the divisional commander, Major-General John Shea, ordered a line from Maltz Horn Farm to the west side of Guillemont to be consolidated and held at all costs.

The British would capture the spur south of Guillemont by advancing 300 yd (270 m) north, from the junction of Cochrane Alley and the Hardecourt–Guillemont road, covered by French attacks into the Maurepas ravine.

[76] The 5th Division, on the right flank of XIV Corps, assembled a battalion of the 13th Brigade in captured trenches on the Leuze Wood Spur, about 400 yd (370 m) short of Falfemont Farm on 3 September.

At noon, the 95th Brigade attacked the spur north of Falfemont Farm towards Guillemont; both battalions took the German first line and then captured dug-outs and a machine-gun nest near Wedge Wood.

A small advance was made on the left, south of Wedge Wood but "feeble" British artillery support was inaccurate and the creeping barrage fell behind one of the attacking battalions.

A further advance by the 95th Brigade to the final objective was not made despite the ground in front appearing to be empty of Germans, as the failure at Falfemont Farm and the position of the 20th Division to the north, would have created a salient.

[100] In 2009, William Philpott criticised the weeks of costly, small, narrow-front attacks against a skilful and determined defence by the Germans, yet Gallwitz "had no better tactical method", which reduced operations to a battle of wills.

[116] Prior and Wilson called Haig's instructions of 2 August, for "careful and methodical" attacks, "pushed forward without delay" so ambiguous as to be incomprehensible and Rawlinson incapable of implementing them.