On the first day, on orders from Army of Tennessee commander John Bell Hood, Hardee's troops attacked the Federals and were repulsed with heavy losses.

Thwarted in his earlier attempts to force Hood to abandon Atlanta, Sherman resolved to make a sweep to the south with six of his seven infantry corps.

Union General-in-chief Ulysses S. Grant ordered Sherman, "to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources".

Union cavalry under Lovell Rousseau joined Sherman's army after a successful raid to cut the Montgomery and West Point Railroad at Opelika, Alabama.

Sherman sent the XXIII and XIV Corps southward to cut the Macon railroad but this operation failed at the Battle of Utoy Creek on August 5–7.

When Kilpatrick finally drove Ross out of Jonesboro late on August 19, it began to rain so hard that the Union cavalrymen were unable to start fires to burn ties and bend the rails.

[26] Both Jacob Dolson Cox and Shelby Foote asserted that a deluded Hood believed that the Union withdrawal meant that Sherman was about to retreat.

Confederate cavalry under Ross and Frank Crawford Armstrong initially put up such tough resistance that Kilpatrick was reinforced by Wells S. Jones' brigade of William Babcock Hazen's XV Corps division.

Howard's leading troops pressed onward against weaker opposition and reached the Flint River where the Union cavalry and Jones' brigade seized a bridge before the Confederate horsemen could burn it.

Hood only realized that the situation was critical at 6 pm when Armstrong and infantry brigade commander Joseph Horace Lewis reported to him that Jonesborough was in immediate danger.

In case Hardee's attack failed, Lee's corps was to march back to Rough and Ready in order to cover the retreat of the army from Atlanta.

Hood's chief of staff, Francis A. Shoup directed that military equipment and ammunition be assembled and prepared for evacuation from Atlanta by train.

[40] Hardee reminded his generals that the troops must attack with fixed bayonets, but brigade commander Arthur Middleton Manigault recalled that when his soldiers were informed, they seemed apathetic.

[42] Meanwhile, Lowrey's division moved northwest, and just as it was turning north toward the Federal lines, it was unexpectedly hit by fire from Kilpatrick's dismounted cavalry, concealed behind fence rails and armed with Spencer repeating rifles.

[47] Schofield's XXIII Corps marched that morning and at 3 pm its lead division under Cox arrived at the railroad 1 mi (1.6 km) south of Rough and Ready.

Finding his division opposed by dismounted cavalry in field works, Cox's troops stormed them and then marched north to Rough and Ready.

Caleb H. Carlton's brigade of Absalom Baird's XIV Corps division reached the railroad 4 mi (6.4 km) north of Jonesborough at 6 pm.

Since Lee's troops never properly fortified their front, Lowrey's men were compelled to construct field fortifications, but for some unknown reason they failed to prepare abatis.

The division's four brigades were deployed from left to right, as follows: Charles H. Olmstead, John Weir (Lowrey's), Hiram B. Granbury, and Daniel Govan.

Sherman planned to place Davis' XIV Corps on Howard's left and wait for Stanley and Schofield to come down from the north to crush Hardee's right flank.

Govan ordered the consolidated 6th/7th Arkansas Infantry Regiment on his right flank to withdraw 50 yd (46 m) and build new field works, but the unit was caught in a crossfire by Union guns, and its new fortifications damaged.

[58] Carlin's unsuccessful advance made Davis comprehend that the Confederate right flank was not "in the air" as reported, but bent back across the railroad.

[61] At 5 pm, when Davis ordered the assault to begin, Estey's men ascended the ridge, threw themselves to the ground to avoid a Confederate volley, and charged.

Cleburne led Alfred Jefferson Vaughan Jr.'s Tennessee brigade into the gap and halted the Federal advance on the west side of the railroad.

The IV Corps began advancing east of the railroad when Davis' men made their climactic assault, but was slowed by extremely thick underbrush.

[65] During the day, Howard's XV and XVI Corps remained largely quiet while Hardee reinforced his right flank by shifting troops from his left.

Because it was misdirected, Blair's XVII Corps only marched as far as Anthony's Bridge where it built field works on the east bank of the Flint River.

Castel pointed out that these casualties were pointless, since the Macon and Western Railroad was cut on the afternoon of August 31 by Schofield and Stanley, rendering Atlanta indefensible.

On the morning of September 3, Sherman received an official message from Slocum that Atlanta was in Federal hands and decided that it was time to end the campaign.

Sherman passed up these chances and single-mindedly focused on his original goal of capturing Atlanta by severing its rail connections to the rest of the Confederacy.