Kolpakchi V. I. Chuikov K. S. Moskalenko V. D. Kryuchenkin The Battle of Kalach[nb 1] took place between the German Sixth Army and elements of the Soviet Stalingrad Front between July 25 and August 11, 1942.

Following the occupation of the Crimea and the Battle of Kharkov, the Germans launched their 1942 summer offensive with the objectives of occupying the Don Basin, Stalingrad, and the Caucasus.

To meet this goal, while the Soviets were generally withdrawing before the German offensive, they retained a bridgehead across the Don at Kalach with lines behind the Tsimla and Chir Rivers.

The relatively open nature of the terrain favors long-range direct fire weapons such as the long 75-mm cannon that were mounted on German Panzer IV tanks.

Their movement and attacks enjoyed air support, but the Sixth Army had temporarily outrun its supplies, particularly in the cases of fuel and ammunition.

After a ten-day hiatus caused by a lack of transportation,[6] German Sixth Army (under the command of General Friedrich Paulus) returned to the offensive.

He proposed to sweep to the Don on both sides of Kalach, take bridgeheads on the run, and then drive a wedge of armor flanked by infantry across the remaining thirty miles.

[Locations 3] To the south, as the daily report put it, Sixth Army "consolidated," because XIV Panzer Corps ran out of motor fuel and the infantry could not make headway against stiffening resistance north and east of Kalach.

At the day's end, XIV Panzer, LI, and XXIV Panzer Corps were ranged shoulder to shoulder on the Stalingrad axis, but the Russians were still holding a forty-mile-wide and twenty-mile-deep bridgehead from Kalach to Nizhny Chir The German forces experienced continuing ammunition shortages, caused by the extraordinarily large numbers of Soviet tanks they were meeting in the Kalach bridgehead.

[10] By 30 July, General Franz Halder at OKH noted in his diary, "Sixth Army's striking power is paralyzed by ammunition and fuel supply difficulties.

[12] During the battle for the city approaches in late July and August, Fiebig's Fliegerkorps VIII provided 6th Army with constant and effective air support, bombing Red Army troop formations, tanks, vehicles, artillery and fortified positions in the battle area and simultaneously blasting enemy supply depots and logistical infrastructure, mobilization centers and road, rail and river traffic.

[13] While waiting for its motor fuel and ammunition stocks to be replenished, Sixth Army was getting Headquarters, XI Corps, which had been held at Kamensk-Shakhtinsky with two infantry divisions as the OKH reserve.

Their spearheads made contact southwest of Kalach by late afternoon, trapping the main body (eight rifle divisions)[14] of the Soviet 62nd Army in an encirclement.

The Soviet Air Forces had poor logistical systems, a low level of crew training and abysmal standards for army-air communications and liaison.

The disparity in effectiveness between the combatants became evident on 12 August when Fliegerkorps VIII destroyed 25 of 26 Soviet aircraft that attacked German airfields that day, suffering no losses in turn.

Months later, this bridgehead became one of the launching points for Operation Uranus, the Soviet offensive that encircled and eventually forced the surrender of the Sixth Army.

[21] The loss of the Kalach bridgehead brought the close-in defense of Stalingrad nearer to actuality on the Soviet side, and the Stavka committed more of its reserves, totalling fifteen rifle divisions and three tank corps between 1 and 20 August.