On 2 December 1853, after the defeat at the Battle of Başgedikler, the beaten and demoralized Anatolian army fell back to the Turkish fortress of Kars.
During the winter of 1853-1854, Abdi Pasha severely neglected the welfare of his conscripted army at Kars and as many as 20,000 men died of malnutrition and disease.
[9] By the summer of 1854, the Anatolian army had been reinforced to the extent that the Turks had numerical superiority over the Russian forces in the southern Caucasus.
Because of Zarif Pasha's passive conduct, the Russians felt safe to move about actively and strike the Turks when they had the advantage.
[10][11] On 1 July, Russian General Bebutov led an expedition of 15,000 men across the Akhuryan River and established an encampment near the village of Kürekdere approximately an hour's march from Turkish outposts at Sobattan and Hadgi-Velikoi.
During the period that the two armies were encamped, the Bashi-bazouk Turkish allies conducted several cavalry raids on the Russians, one in which they suffered many casualties because the Turks failed to support them.
When Guyon made recommendations as he did earlier that summer to attack the Russians at their bases, Zarif Pasha rejected the proposals outright.
Reluctantly, Zarif Pasha approved a plan put forward by Guyon to immediately attack Bebutov's army as it was encamped at Kürekdere and then turn and pursue the Russian detachment advancing upon Erzurum.
[19] Guyon's plan called for the army to set out at sunset taking advantage of the moonlight to travel through the night to a position near the Russian camp and then to attack at dawn.
All the benefit of an early morning surprise attack with a concentrated force was lost and the Russians were up and in battle formation when the first of the Turks arrived.
[3][22] On Sunday, 6 August 1854, the two armies met at Kürekdere and the battle started by means of a 30 minute exchange of cannon fire.
During that struggle, the Russian infantry routed a Turkish battalion composed of inexperienced conscripts who quickly broke and fled.
Zarif Pasha ultimately brought his defeated army back to Kars and took refuge in the fortress expecting the Russians to attack.
[27] The defeat of the Anatolian army at Kürekdere can be attributed to the incompetence of Zarif Pasha and the cowardice of the majority of the Turkish officers.
The conduct of the Turkish officers in general was shameful as they deserted their men and fled back to their camp to secure their baggage and retreat to Kars.
[28][29][30] The Times correspondent, Humphry Sandwith witnessed the battle and wrote: With a vivid impression of the whole engagement, from the first cannonshot to the last straggling discharges of musketry, I can use no language too strong to express my reprobation of the conduct of nearly four-fifths of the Turkish officers present.
In accounting for the defeat of an army numbering nearly 40,000 men of all arms by a hostile force of less than one-half that number, it is not sufficient to say that the management of the whole battle on the side of the Turks was a series of blunders from first to last; strategical errors might have protracted the engagement, and have added to the cost of a victory, but downright cowardice alone – which no generalship could have redeemed – gave the day to the Russians.
An hour after the action began, there was hardly a Bunbashi (major) or Murallai (colonel) to be seen; almost to a man they had deserted their regiments, and fled back to the camp to secure their baggage and send it off to Kars.
[29] The battle of Kürekdere demonstrated again that the Turkish army was incapable of pushing the Russians out of the Trans-Caucasus without the assistance of its allies.
Zarif Pasha was accused of corruption in the administration of the Anatolian army and taking offensive action in the battle of Kürekdere when his orders were to only be on the defensive.
[32][33][34] The Ottoman Empire's allies recommended that all foreign officers at Kars be recalled and that the command of the army be entrusted to General Klapka.