The Battle of Velestino (Greek: Μάχη του Βελεστίνου, Turkish: Velestin Muharebesi) comprised two separate combats, which took place on 27 April [O.S.

The pass of Velestino controlled the road and railway lines linking the port city of Volos with the interior of the Thessalian plain.

On the next day, however, the Ottoman attack in the same area was more successful, as this time the Greeks were unable to bring in sufficient reinforcements to counter the outflanking manoeuvre.

[1] This forced the Greek commander-in-chief, Crown Prince Constantine, to abandon any idea of defending the line of the Pineios River, and withdraw further to Farsala.

This gave the Greeks time to regroup and organize a defensive position at Farsala, and also send forces from there to cover the approaches to Volos at Velestino.

Its strategic significance lies in its geographic position in a pass between the Chalkodonion–Karadagh Mountains (the ancient Cynoscephalae Hills) to the west and a western spur of Mount Pelion on the east, through which the road and railway line linking the Pagasetic Gulf and the port of Volos to the inland Thessalian plain and Larissa.

Only towards the end of the day were trains found to carry the 8th Regiment's III Battalion (III/8), an infantry company, and Colonel Smolenskis himself to the area.

Faced with stiff resistance, Suleiman Pasha now employed his own artillery about one kilometre north of the Rizomylos bridge, and deployed his entire division: three companies were to continue the attack on the railway station, while the other seven were to advance towards Volos.

Mistakenly estimating the Greek forces at much larger than they actually were, the Ottoman commander ordered a retreat, first to Gherli and then, along with the Bursa Regiment, to Kileler.

[8] When Smolenskis arrived at the nearby village of Aerino after nightfall, the local railway station staff informed him of the rumours that Velestino had been captured by the Ottomans.

[9][12] After his arrival at Gherli around noon on 29 April, Mahmud Muhtar urged Naim Pasha and Suleiman Pasha to attack before the Greeks had had enough time to establish strong fortifications; he also pointed out that the rest of the Ottoman army was at the very same time preparing to advance on Farsala, and that the Greek forces opposing them were not as strong as they thought.

[9][12]The energetic Mahmud Muhtar would prove to be the driving force of the Ottoman efforts to break through the Velestino position, but the Ottomans remained hampered by the lack of unified command: Naim Pasha, who outranked Mahmud Muhtar, disregarded his advice and proved himself a dilatory and hesitant commander.

It comprised the Bursa, Orhaneli, and Bilecik infantry battalions, a horse artillery battery, and 7 cavalry companies (three from the 6th Guards Regiment and the 13th Cavalry Regiment), and was intended to operate as a diversion, while the main attack would be led by Naim Pasha on the left (eastern) flank along the road to Volos, against the Greek centre and right.

[9][12] On the Greek side, the forces under Smolenskis' command on 29 April numbered 6 infantry companies on the feet of Malouka Hill, to the west of Velestino, with an artillery battery on the Panagia height.

A battalion occupied the low ground before the pass itself, between the Velestino railway station and the height of Ovrias Gala to the northeast, near Rizomylos.

[9] After about half an hour, Mahmud Muhtar had gauged the Greek strength, which he estimated at 3–4 battalions with a few mountain artillery pieces, and, given the numerical superiority of the Ottoman forces, decided to launch an all-out attack.

[14] According to Colmar von der Goltz, Mahmud Muhtar suggested a night attack against the Greek left at 03:00, but again this did not take place because the additional battalion promised by Naim Pasha for this operation failed to arrive on time.

[9] With the shift of troops and focus to their right, the Ottomans effectively reversed their original plan and made their main effort against the Greek left.

[20][13] At the same time, on the Ottoman left, Naim Pasha grew increasingly anxious about the situation of his forces, which were engaged already for seven hours without success, and pleaded with his fellow commanders to apply more pressure on their own front.

[13] As a result, Mahmud Muhtar and Suleiman Pasha decided to launch a frontal attack against the Greek left at Karadagh with the infantry they had held in reserve, and the seven cavalry companies, 300 men under Ibrahim Bey, were instructed to stand by to intervene at the "suitable moment".

When Ibrahim Bey realized this, it was too late: if he tried to turn south, his men would suffer heavy casualties to the entrenched Greeks on its flank.

The counterattack launched by Major Kopsidas, if properly supported, might have destroyed the eastern Ottoman column, but the opportunity was allowed to be lost.

[23] Smolenskis expected the Ottomans to try again on the next day, and therefore asked for and received ammunition and reinforcements in the form of the 1st Independent Infantry Battalion and three dismounted cavalry companies, which arrived on 3 May.

[24] On the Ottoman side, Mahmud Muhtar reported to Edhem Pasha in person on 1 May, and expressed the opinion that the bulk of the Greek army was at Velestino, recommending an immediate attack with greater forces.

[13][29] Around 10:00, as the Ottoman forces had approached the Greek positions on the left, a sudden rain and hail storm broke out, reducing visibility to almost zero.

[30] On the extreme Greek left, the Ottoman outflanking manoeuvre was stopped thanks to the timely intervention of two companies from the 4th Evzone Battalion at Ayvali.

[16][33] Once informed of these developments, Colonel Smolenskis ordered 7th Regiment to hold at all costs and sent two reserve companies to bolster its position, but they arrived too late.

[33] At the same time, Smolenskis was informed by telegram of the defeat of the main Greek army at the Battle of Farsala and its withdrawal to Domokos.

[34] Combined with the critical situation on his left, around 15:00 Smolenskis ordered the Brigade to start retreating, beginning with the more exposed units of 8th Regiment in the lower ground.

[13][33] Velestino was captured by the Ottomans on 7 May, where Edhem Pasha met with the European consuls from Volos, who announced to him that the city had been evacuated by the Greek forces.