The Australians repulsed the attacks, except at Lagnicourt, where German troops broke in, took prisoners, destroyed six artillery pieces and captured confidential documents.

The new regime, known as the third OHL, ended the offensive at Verdun on the Western Front and requested proposals for a new shorter defensive position in France.

[2] By the end of September, Rupprecht had no reserves left on the Somme and another thirteen fresh divisions were sent to oppose the British, troops being scraped up wherever they could be found.

[2] For the Abwehrschlacht (defensive battle) expected in 1917, the Hindenburg Line was to be built across the base of the Noyon Salient, from Neuville Vitasse near Arras, through St Quentin and Laon to the Chemin des Dames ridge.

On 18 March the main body of German troops reached the Hindenburg Line (Siegfriedstellung) where work was still being done to remedy defects in the original position.

On 13 April, the 6th Army chief of staff notified Moser that the 3rd Guard Division was being transferred to the Gruppe after having had three months of rest and training.

The Fifth Army had been stripped of divisions and artillery and bringing up the remaining guns and ammunition over the supply desert created by German demolitions was slow.

Fifth Army attacks on 2 April captured the German outpost villages from Doignies to Croisilles and Gough ordered that risks be taken to advance as much heavy artillery as possible.

The heavy guns were delayed by German road demolitions and the field artillery had to be moved in relays due to a shortage of horses.

[13] The Hindenburg Line defences enclosing the village of Bullecourt formed a re-entrant for about 2,500 yd (2,300 m) to the Balkonstellung (Balcony Trench) around Quéant, defended by the élite German 27th Division.

[17] At 1:00 a.m. Bullecourt was subjected to a gas bombardment by Livens projectors and Stokes 4-inch mortars as the six Australian battalions assembled out in the snow of no man's land and waited for the tanks to arrive.

Only four tanks reached their start line by 4:30 a.m. but drowning the sound of their engines with machine-gun fire failed and they were heard in the German defences.

Another tank also veered right and crossed the first trench of the Balkonstellung opposite Grenadier Regiment 123 and was knocked out by machine-guns firing armour-piercing (K bullet) ammunition.

[26] (From north to south [right to left] details from Bean [1982])[27] Moser briefed Falkenhausen that the attack would prevent the British from closing up to the main Siegfriedstellung defences, inflict as many casualties as possible and destroy equipment, especially artillery.

Some troops claimed to have entered the north end of Demicourt and the eastern fringe of Boursies, which changed hands several times.

Regiment Guard Fusilier had billeted 10 mi (16 km) back until nightfall on 14 April when it began its approach march in cold and stormy weather.

[32] On the right flank, the III Bataillon Regiment Lehr crossed the path of a battalion of the 2nd Guard Reserve Division and was so badly delayed that it reached its assembly area an hour late.

The number of attackers, their knowledge of the ground and the silent approach succeeded and RIR 15 reported at 3:25 a.m. that it had received only sporadic machine-gun fire.

On the left flank, RIR 15 were surprised to overrun the Australian artillery in the Lagnicourt valley, thought still to be near Vaulx-Vraucourt, whose move had not been seen by German air reconnaissance.

At about 6:00 a.m. the German troops in the Hirondelle valley and the spur began to receive artillery-fire from the Australian guns west of Ecoust and at Morchies, directed by the crew of a British artillery-observation aircraft who flew over the battlefield at very low altitude.

The division claimed to have demolished 22 guns, damaged another eleven and taken 283 prisoners as pioneers blocked wells in Lagnicourt by detonating demolition charges not blown when the village had been captured on 26 March.

By 6:20 a.m. the centre and left flank artillery groups of the division barraged Lagnicourt and Noreuil and the heavy guns of the 1st Anzac Corps ignored the danger of being captured and continued to fire.

Reports from a reconnaissance aircraft led to every gun in range bombarding the Hindenburg Line wire to catch German troops as they returned.

German prisoners complained about the short notice of the attack and lack of time to reconnoitre, which was also noted in the divisional after-action reports read by Rupprecht.

The Germans had found that the Australian Lewis guns had been of great effectiveness, "cleverly emplaced and bravely fought" and many reports noted the need for a similar weapon.

[39] In 1939, Wolfgang Foersterthe editor of volume XII of Der Weltkrieg, the Reichsarchiv official history, wrote that the success of the attack was limited by the short notice and insufficient artillery support.

The authors agreed with Moser that several days were necessary to arrange a night attack but disagreed that the situation at Arras was too dangerous to delay; the preparations could have been carried out over a longer period and been camouflaged to retain surprise.

[42] In 1939, the historians of the Reichsarchiv wrote that the attackers inflicted 1,500 casualties took nearly 500 prisoners and 22 machine-guns; four artillery batteries had been overrun but only five guns were destroyed.

Resting units only moved back 2.5–3.1 mi (4–5 km) and were kept busy repairing defences and digging more reserve positions at night.

German artillery replied with harassing and destructive bombardments which, at dawn every day, were directed at assembly areas and jumping-off lines.