Following that engagement, where Haig had rallied his troops, revolver in hand, he succumbed to panic, writing to the French High Command about the imminent debacle.

He had greatly overestimated German numbers, was "[mentally] completely destroyed" – as described by James Edmonds, Chief of Staff of the 4th Division.

[1] Ignorant of the manoeuvre of I Corps, Smith-Dorrien intended to continue marching, as mentioned by Wilkinson Bird, Colonel of the Royal Irish Fusiliers.

Edmund Allenby, commander of the II Corps' cavalry, claimed that both his men and the horses were "almost finished" and that battle at Le Cateau was inevitable, the enemy being so close.

The commander of the 2nd Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, was given a written order that "There will now be NO retirement for the fighting troops; fill up your trenches, with water, food and ammunition as far as you can".

75th Field Artillery Regiment said that the battle "strengthened the self-confidence of the German troops … all the more so because the British army was made up almost exclusively of long-service active army troops, who were superbly trained and equipped.German satisfaction in part arose from a mistaken belief that they had defeated the BEF, not II Corps and a cavalry brigade.

It was this mistake which allowed II Corps to retire as German troops were given a night of rest instead of being sent to pursue the British forces.

[14] In 2013, the historian, Spencer Jones, wrote that strategically, the stand of II Corps achieved Smith-Dorrien's aim of relieving pressure on the retreat.

[17] In 2011, Terry Zuber wrote that having suffered 7,000 casualties and with another 2,500–3,000 footsore and exhausted men having to be evacuated to Le Mans to recuperate, II Corps was not battle-worthy for at least two days.

[18] In 2008, Antony Bird wrote that the Commonwealth War Graves Commission counted 1,200 British troops killed and gave a total of 7,812 casualties.