Bahman decided not to commit this army to battle until its strength had been augmented by the large forces of Christian Arabs who remained loyal to the Empire.

With this strategy in mind, he divided the Muslim garrison of Hira into two corps, one of which he placed under Al-Qa'qa'a ibn Amr at-Tamimi and the other under Abu Laila.

A few days later the entire Muslim army was concentrated at Ayn al-Tamr, except for a small garrison left under Iyad ibn Ghanm to look after Hira.

Khalid sent Al-Qa'qa'a ibn Amr at-Tamimi to Husaid and Abu Laila to Khanafis with orders to destroy the Persian armies at those places.

But this was not to be; for the march to Khanafis was longer than to Husaid, and Abu Laila failed to move his forces with sufficient speed to make up for this difference.

Thus the commander of the army at Khanafis heard about the Muslim's victory at Husaid; he withdraw his forces to Muzayyah and joined the Christian Arabs.

To deal with this objective he designed a manoeuvre which, seldom practised in history, is one of the most difficult to control and co-ordinate-a simultaneous converging attack from three directions made at night.

The three corps would march from their respective locations at Husaid, Khanafis and Ain-ut-Tamr along separate routes he had specified and meet on a given night and at a given hour at a place a few miles short of Muzayyah.

The Muslims tried to finish this army, but large numbers of Persians and Arabs nevertheless managed to get away, helped by the very darkness that had cloaked the surprise attack.