After a brief period in which he pursued Hood, Sherman decided instead to cut his main army off from these lines and "live off the land" in his famed March to the Sea from Atlanta to Savannah.

By doing so, he would avoid having to defend hundreds of miles of supply lines against constant raids, through which he predicted he would lose "a thousand men monthly and gain no result" against Hood's army.

[7] Sherman disengaged and turned east, leaving the matter of Hood's army and the defense of Tennessee to Thomas[note 3].

[11] Furious at his failure at Spring Hill, Hood pursued Schofield to the north and encountered the Union at Franklin behind strong fortifications.

In the Battle of Franklin on November 30, Hood ordered almost 31,000 of his men to assault the Union works before Schofield could withdraw across the Harpeth River and escape to Nashville.

[17] Schofield withdrew from Franklin during the night and marched into the defensive works of Nashville on December 1, there coming under the command of Thomas, who now had a combined force of approximately 55,000 men.

[18] While Wilson's cavalry had combat experience, most of it had been of the wrong kind at the hands of Nathan Bedford Forrest, John Hunt Morgan, or Joe Wheeler.

[20][note 6] By 1864, a 7-mile-long semicircular Union defensive line on the south and west sides of the city protected Nashville from attacks from those directions.

[29] The weather turned cold and many Confederate soldiers took shelter in simple pits which were just big enough for two or three men to sleep alongside each other with a small fire at one end.

Alabama soldier Edgar Jones wrote that while he enjoyed the warmth of his new home it gave him "a sort of graveyard feeling" since the shelters were remarkably similar to graves.

Bate's Division and one of the two attached infantry brigades returned to Nashville, but Hood had seriously diminished his already outnumbered forces, and he had also deprived his army of its strongest and most mobile unit, Forrest and his cavalry.

Despite the severe beating it had suffered at Franklin, Hood's Army of Tennessee presented a threat by its mere presence and ability to maneuver.

Gen. James H. Wilson, was poorly armed and mounted, and he did not want to proceed to a decisive battle without effective protection of his flanks.

When Sherman proposed his March to the Sea, Ulysses S. Grant and Henry Halleck had objected to it on the grounds that Hood would use the opportunity to invade Tennessee.

Lincoln had little patience for slow generals and remarked of the situation, "This seems like the McClellan and Rosecrans strategy of do nothing and let the rebels raid the country.

Two Neosho sailors were awarded the Medal of Honor for going out onto the shell swept deck and raising the ship's flag after it had been shot down.

[49] The Confederate batteries effectively closed the river below Nashville to supply traffic until they finally were driven off by Union cavalry on December 15.

[61] In the meantime, the IV Corps had been tasked with making a frontal assault from Granny White and Hillsboro Pikes on the left end of the Confederate line.

Schofield, imagining that he was outnumbered and in danger of an attack on his southern flank, demurred, requested that Smith send him additional divisions.

At about 3:30 p.m. he sent a message to Smith and Thomas that unless he were given orders to the contrary, his division was going to attack Shy's Hill and the Confederate line immediately to its east in the next five minutes.

Wilson badly hurt Carter L. Stevenson's rearguard division in actions on December 17 and 18, but was forced to stop because of the lack of supplies.

[87] Thomas had asked Rear Admiral S. P. Lee, commanding the Tennessee River naval squadron, to destroy the Confederate bridge.

[88] Steedman's Provisional Division was sent by rail from Nashville to Chattanooga and from there by river boat to Decatur, Alabama, to cut off Hood's retreat.

However, Steedman's cavalry under the command of Colonel William Jackson Palmer captured the Confederate pontoon train on December 30 along with a large number of supply wagons.

[93] Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard, Hood's nominal superior, advised the Confederate President on January 13 that the Army of Tennessee had fewer than 15,000 men.

Historian David Eicher remarked, "If Hood mortally wounded his army at Franklin, he would kill it two weeks later at Nashville.

This movement failed, due to lack of support from Nashville's civic leaders, who as Southerners were not particularly interested in commemorating a battle that was such a profound Confederate defeat.

Erected in the years immediately following World War I, the monument honors the soldiers of both sides and celebrated a united nation.

[98] In 1999 the monument was relocated to the Nashville Battlefield Park at the intersection of Granny White Pike and Clifton Lane, just north of the Confederate line on the first day of the battle.

[99] It was dedicated by members of the Minnesota Civil War Commemoration Task Force and the Battle of Nashville Preservation Society on November 16, 2014.