A French assault at Vimy Ridge on the Artois plateau was also planned to threaten the road, rail and canal junctions at La Bassée from the south as the British attacked from the north.

The 1st Canadian Division at Fleurbaix, several kilometres north-east of Neuve Chapelle, provided artillery support and machine-gun fire as a diversion to prevent the Germans from reinforcing the sector.

[3][4] The artillery bombardment was followed by an infantry assault at 8:05 a.m.[5] The Garhwal Brigade of the Meerut Division, Indian Corps attacked with all four battalions on a 600 yd (550 m) front, from Port Arthur to Pont Logy.

The leading companies then advanced beyond the Port Arthur–Neuve Chapelle road without waiting for the planned thirty-minute artillery preparation and took the village by 9:00 a.m. along with 200 prisoners and five machine-guns.

[6] A gap of 250 yd (230 m) had been created by the loss of direction on the right, where the German garrison had been severely bombarded but the survivors, about two platoons of the 10th Company, Infantry Regiment 16, fought on.

[6] The German defences in the centre were quickly overrun on a 1,600 yd (1,500 m) front and Neuve Chapelle was captured by 10:00 a.m.[8] At Haig's request, the British Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Sir John French, released the 5th Cavalry Brigade to exploit the expected breakthrough.

[11] The battle at Neuve Chapelle showed that trench defences could be breached if the attack was carefully prepared and disguised to achieve at least local surprise.

In his report at the end of March, Major-General John Du Cane wrote that the First Army command system disintegrated after the capture of Neuve Chapelle.

Although Haig claimed he had made his intent plain to his subordinates, he felt they had not grasped the "spirit" of the plan and had failed to press on when initial objectives had been captured.

[13] The battle had no strategic effect but showed that the British were capable of mounting an organised attack, after several winter months of static warfare.

Sheldon called the British analysis of the battle "bluster" and wrote that Joseph Joffre, the French commander, praised the results of the first day, then dismissed the significance of the attack "Mais ce fut un succès sans lendemain" (But it was a success which led to nothing.).

[18] After the battle, French reported to Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, that fatigue and the shortage of ammunition had forced a suspension of the offensive.

News of the ammunition shortage led to the Shell Crisis of 1915 which, along with the resignation of Admiral Fisher over the naval attack on the Dardanelles, brought down the Liberal government.

The battle also affected British tactical thinking with the idea that infantry offensives accompanied by artillery barrages could break the trench warfare stalemate.