An earlier British attempt to relieve Kimberley, led by Lieutenant General Lord Methuen, had been opposed by Boers under Cronjé and Koos de la Rey.

Although the Boers had failed to prevent the British crossing the Modder River on 28 November, they had fought them to a standstill at the Battle of Magersfontein thirteen days later, inflicting heavy casualties.

Field Marshal Roberts had been appointed to command the British forces in South Africa in December 1899, succeeding General Buller.

Leaving Buller in command of the attempt to relieve Ladysmith, Roberts collected large numbers of reinforcements which had recently arrived in South Africa along the railway line between the Orange and Modder rivers on 11 February 1900.

While Methuen's 1st Division demonstrated against the Boer entrenchments at Magersfontein and the Highland Brigade under Major General Hector MacDonald marched 20 miles (32 km) westward to Koedoesberg and fixed the Boers' attention to their right flank, Roberts's large force began marching east in secret, late on 11 February.

The next day, 13 February, the British mounted force made a gruelling march of 30 miles (48 km) under a blazing sun to capture fords across the Modder.

French's division had to wait at the fords (at Klip Drift) during the next day until the leading infantry reached them, after making an equally exhausting march.

Only scattered and disorganised Boers opposed them, and the enormous mass of British horsemen broke through their thin line, concealed in the dust cloud they created.

French was to further tire his men on 16 February by futile attempts to intercept one of the Boers' Creusot 40-pounder siege guns (nicknamed "Long Tom") which was withdrawing to the north.

Their position at Magersfontein was no longer relevant and they were in danger of being besieged in Jacobsdal by the British 7th Division under Lieutenant General Charles Tucker, which had turned west from Klip Drift.

They were starting to cross the river when a force of 1,500 British mounted troops, almost all of French's fit horses and men who had covered the 40 miles (64 km) from Kimberley in another desperately tiring march, opened fire on them unexpectedly from the north, causing confusion.

His reasons for doing so are unclear because the British had insufficient cavalry and it would therefore have been an easy matter for Cronjé to brush them aside and link up with other Boers east of the Modder.

Lieutenant General Kelly-Kenny, commanding the British 6th Division, had a sound plan to lay siege to Cronjé and bombard his force into surrender.

While casualties from the bombardment had been reduced to around 100 dead and 250 wounded by the soft bank of the Modder, the horses, oxen and wagons had no trenches in which to shelter.

Cronjé's encampment was subjected to an increasingly heavy artillery bombardment, as more guns (including a battery of 5-inch medium howitzers and another of 1-pounder "pom-poms") joined the besieging British forces.

On Wednesday 21 February 1900 De Wet finally abandoned the hill called Kitchener's Kopje, only two hours before Roberts had planned to give up and retire his troops to Klipkraal Drift west of Paardeberg.

Pakenham reviewed both sides of the subsequent surrender by Cronjé on the basis of new archival research and found that Roberts' nerve failed him when he strongly urged retirement of British troops.

"[8] South African government historian J. H. Breytenbach disagreed: (Translation) That general Piet Cronjé surrendered on Majuba Day was not his fault, and the small group of women and children in his encampment had nothing to do with it.

In order to understand his capitulation, it is essential to understand two things well: the first is that his approximately 4,000 infantry who had only 5 cannons, were trapped by a superior force of approximately 40,000 soldiers with 100 cannons, and that he was also cut off from De Wet's burghers outside the British encirclement line by a completely unfordable river.The Boer War marked the first overseas deployment of the Canadian Army.

The account of this battle and of Cronjé's surrender is given in much greater depth by Banjo Paterson, war correspondent for the Sydney Morning Herald, "embedded" with the New South Wales Lancers.

Paterson states that Cronjé had decided on the previous night to surrender at 6am on 27 February as his supplies were exhausted, but when the Canadians[9] attacked at 4 am – The Maritimes of Companies G and H were led by Lieutenant Otter[10] – he refused to be hurried and fought for two hours at a cost to the Canadians of "15 or 20 shot and many more wounded", then surrendered at 6 am as planned, and with some considerable degree of dignity.

[11] This account differs slightly in detail from that above and deserves to be noted, describing as it does the role of the Australians[12] in the early part of the battle on 22 February.

[13] Two British soldiers were awarded posthumous Victoria Crosses: For two decades afterwards, Canadians would gather on 27 February (known in Canada as "Paardeberg Day") around memorials to the South African War to say prayers and honour veterans.