The attack was eventually repulsed, and Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, unsatisfied with Amin's refusal to renounce his claims to Tanzanian territory and the international community's failure to strongly condemn the invasion, ordered his forces to advance into southern Uganda with the aim of capturing the towns of Masaka and Mbarara.
In 1971 Colonel Idi Amin launched a military coup that overthrew the President of Uganda, Milton Obote, precipitating a deterioration of relations with the neighbouring Tanzania.
The Uganda Army subsequently pillaged the area it occupied, murdering civilians, stealing cattle, and destroying property, triggering the flight of 40,000 inhabitants southward.
[3] Tanzania eventually halted the assault, mobilised anti-Amin opposition groups, and launched a counter-offensive, expelling the Ugandans from its territory.
[4] On 22 January 1979 the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) seized the Ugandan border town of Mutukula to counter any further threats to Kagera.
[12] Despite holding the high ground, Ugandan commanders apparently did not know how to use their positions to their advantage; only a single trench was present on Nsambya Hill.
More comprehensive intelligence reports informed the Tanzanians that 500 Ugandan soldiers, equipped with armoured personnel carriers and tanks, were garrisoning Katera, which was located along a peninsula in Sango Bay.
Fearing that the first way was predictable and would expose his troops to Ugandan tank fire, Brigadier John Butler Walden ordered his unit to travel down the footpath.
[15] A handful of soldiers who had grown up in the lakeside villages near Bukoba and thus cognizant of local language and culture were recruited as advance scouts.
Equipped with normal clothing and rare goods to win favour with the locals, they moved out to gather information on the path's condition.
The trek lasted 10 and a half hours, longer than was expected, and involved the brigade dealing with mosquitoes and tsetse flies and wading through shoulder-deep water.
Despite supplies being carried on the soldiers' heads, the wet conditions ruined their ammunition and rations and temporarily disabled radios.
The capture of Katera made the Uganda Army aware of a Tanzanian offensive, but it could not determine the precise direction or timing of the next assault.
[19] In an effort to expedite their progress while under the threat of air attack, Tanzanian troops deployed missile launchers and fired them on Ugandan positions, overwhelming the defenders.
[20] The Tanzanians seized six medium tanks and captured or destroyed several armoured personnel carriers and artillery pieces during the fighting.
[23][24] Nyerere originally planned to halt his forces in Masaka and allow the Ugandan rebels to attack Kampala and overthrow Amin, as he feared that scenes of Tanzanian troops occupying the city would reflect poorly on his country's image abroad.
However, Ugandan rebel forces did not have the strength to defeat the incoming Libyan units, so Nyerere decided to use the TPDF to take Kampala.
[26] Combat operations in the country continued until 3 June, when Tanzanian forces reached the Sudanese border and eliminated the last resistance.