[23] Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of the British forces in France, said there was enough American ammunition to support a regimental attack for about nine hours.

[32][33] United States Army divisions arriving in France were made up mostly of raw recruits augmented by regulars who had never fired a Springfield rifle.

Upon arrival, "doughboys" were subjected to a training regimen which began with a heavy dose of physical conditioning and drilling with emphasis on, as stated by General William L. Sibert, “development of a proper disciplinary spirit”.

During the two-day meeting there was a heated discussion over the shipment of American troops with both the British and French demanding that only infantry and machine gun units be shipped.

[38] On 3 June, Pershing sent a cable to Newton Baker, Secretary of War, indicating the military situation in the Marne salient had become bleak with the French line giving way and the seven divisions occupying that portion of the front losing almost all their materiel and a large percentage of their personnel.

[39] Two weeks later, 14 June, after the American 1st Division took Cantigny, Foch wrote to General Philippe Pétain, commander of the Armies of the North and Northeast, “I have the honor to invite your attention to the importance of the communications net at Soissons, which is used for the supply of four German divisions on the front and which constitutes at the same time the sole junction point of all the railroads available to the enemy on the Aisne and south thereof.”[40] Foch's letter to Pétain eventually reached General Charles Emmanuel Mangin, commander of the French Tenth Army.

The final objective, the road and rail network running south from Soissons in the Crise River valley, was about 7.5 mi (12 km) to the east and was hidden from view because of the sloping terrain.

[60] On 14 July Fayolle issued a memorandum ordering the entire Group of Armies of the Reserve not to trust anyone not personally known to be reliable, move only at night, light no fires, and to report anything and anyone suspicious.

On 12 July, less than six days before the start of the attack, both the 1st and 2nd Divisions were assigned to the newly formed American III Corps which was attached to the French Sixth Army in the same order.

[63] Fayolle's Chief of Staff, General Gabriel Alexandre Paquette [fr], sent a telegram two days later attaching both divisions to Mangin's Tenth Army.

[64] The American 1st Division was bivouacked in the Forêt de Compiègne on 16 July and spent the entire day under cover of the woods to avoid detection by German aircraft.

Compelled to march off the trail and aided only by flashes of lightning, the infantry moved forward hanging onto the equipment of the man ahead to maintain the column.

Again on 17 July, while in Vivières, General Albert Daugan, commander of the Moroccan 1st Division, offered Harbord battle orders prepared by his chief of staff, Colonel Henri Giraud.

[75] Harbord said of the experience, “All arriving units told … of the weary night ride and the arbitrary debussment at unknown points, and of the lack of information and of an inevitable dispersion as a consequence of no co-ordination of the several bus groups.

A second line of resistance with strong points at Saconin-et-Breuil, Chaudun, Vierzy, and the west edge of the Bois de Mauloy near St. Rémy-Blanzy was also to be established.

[85] Beginning on the evening 12 July, artillery of the Ninth Army began firing on points of assembly and routes of approach in order to interfere as much as possible with Allied preparations.

However, 28th Infantry began taking heavy fire directed at its flanks as they approached Saint Amand Farm, a strong point in the French 153rd Division's zone to their north.

Berdoulat, wishing to exploit his early success, issued orders for the American 1st Division to reach the line Berzy-le-Sec – Buzancy facing northeast to block the southern outlets of the Crise River.

New artillery was placed on the hills overlooking the Soissons – Château-Thierry road 3 mi (4.8 km) from the front and fresh machine gun units were brought up.

By noon the 2nd Battalion, 110th Grenadiers, 28th Division was isolated on the western lip of Chazelle Ravine and forced to withdraw to rally positions east of the Soissons–Paris road.

Short rounds from a German artillery barrage mistakenly fell on its own troops causing heavy casualties and forced the battalion to withdraw north of Buzancy.

Most of the Senegalese turned north to flank the Bois du Quesnoy while 49th Company started taking fire from Maison Neuve and Chaudun.

[122] On the night of 17 July, Colonel LaRoy Upton, commander of the 9th Infantry Regiment, managed to get all but two of his companies through the Forêt de Retz and into position before midnight.

[126] Early in the attack, 23rd Infantry made the turn to the southeast and proceeded in good order until they reached Vauxcastille where they met stiff resistance.

[130] In the southern portion of the division sector, some elements of 23rd Infantry and attached Marines approached Vierzy in the morning, causing most of the German defenders to flee.

Operating in the sector south of 2nd Division, they were attacking to the north and east on a line Montrembœuf Ferme – Bois de Mauloy toward Parcy-et-Tigny, well beyond the Americans.

[161] The Seventh Army reported that XIII Corps had been pushed back at Vierzy and southeast of Villers-Hélon in the direction of Parcy-et-Tigny and Villemontoire during the morning.

Coupled with the threat against the rear of the forces holding the salient, the decision was made to withdraw by echelon while strengthening the resistance power of the front.

Elements of 18th Infantry, operating on the division's southern boundary, organized themselves along the railroad tracks several hundred yards/meters northeast of the Bois de Maubuée.

Due to difficulty locating the infantry front line the rolling barrage was too far advanced to offer sufficient protection to the assaulting troops.