He therefore adopted a strong defensive position facing north-west, with his right anchored on the Zenne at Steenkerque and his left near Enghien, assuming the Allies would not dare to attack it.

This approach conformed with then accepted tactical wisdom, with battles considered too risky and unpredictable, unless there was a clear chance of defeating the enemy.

In reality, however, they served to enable 800 pioneers equipped with axes and shovels to widen forest paths, fill ditches and make passages in hedges unnoticed.

Once the pioneers had finished their work, Lieutenant General Württemberg was to take possession of Steenkerke with a vanguard of 5,000 to 6,000 Dutch, English, Danish and German infantrymen, and artillery of six low three-pounders and ten regimental pieces.

The second column, commanded by the Frisian stadtholder, Henry Casimir II, with a strength of 6,000 to 7,000 men, composed of the Dutch brigades of Salisch and l'Ecluse.

[7] Led by the Duke of Wurttemberg the Allied advance guard of infantry and pioneers deployed silently around 5:00 a.m. close to the French encampments.

After a short firefight, Wurttemberg managed to take control of a hill and forest opposite Steenkerke and then deployed artillery,[9] with which he at 9:00 a.m. started methodically cannonading the enemy.

[10] William of Orange considered it unwise to wait any longer and despite the delay, loss of surprise and the absence of 2 of the 3 columns, ordered Wurttemberg and Mackay around 1:00 p.m. to finally begin the main attack.

Württemberg raged to Mérode-Westerloo, the young adjutant who came to deliver this news, that he would have been able to drive the French out of their positions if the second and third columns had shown up, when now only 14,000 men had been at his disposal.

[9] Seeing an opportunity for a decisive victory, Luxembourg committed the elite Maison du Roi to a frontal assault, reinforced by troops from Enghien under Boufflers.

[4] William then ordered his troops to fall back on their original positions around Halle, covered by a rear-guard under Hendrik Van Nassau-Ouwerkerk.

[13] Following the battle, some English politicians claimed their heavy losses were caused not through incompetence, but a deliberate act by Solms, and demanded his removal.

According to Voltaire's L'Âge de Louis XIV, it was in fashion after the Battle of Steenkerque, where the French gentlemen had to fight with disarranged cravats on account of the surprise sprung by the Allies.