It is also notable for the failure of the Russians to encode their radio messages, broadcasting their daily marching orders in the clear, which allowed the Germans to make their movements with the confidence they would not be flanked.

The almost miraculous outcome brought considerable prestige to General (later Field Marshal) Paul von Hindenburg and his rising staff-officer Erich Ludendorff.

According to Prit Buttar, "In combination with his own strong desire to fight an offensive war featuring outflanking and encircling movements, Schlieffen went on to develop his plan for a sweeping advance through Belgium.

General Yakov Grigoryevich Zhilinsky was the man in charge of this attack and had pledged to put 800,000 men on the front by the 15th day of mobilization.

Of course due to the rushed nature of this attack, the Russian war machine developed numerous cracks and failures as a result of poor communication between the front and command.

The French army's Plan XVII at the outbreak of the war involved swift mobilization followed by an immediate attack to drive the Germans from Alsace and Lorraine.

[14] Despite their difficulties, the Russians promised the French that they would promptly engage the armies of Austria-Hungary in the south and on day 15 would invade German East Prussia.

[15] According to Prit Buttar, "In addition to the fortifications amongst the Masurian Lake District, the Germans had built a series of major forts around Königsberg in the 19th century and had then modernised them over the years.

Adding to their supply problems, the Russians deployed large numbers of cavalry and Cossacks; every day each horse needed ten times the resources that a man required.

[17] The First Army commander was Paul von Rennenkampf, who in the Russo-Japanese War had earned a reputation for "exceptional energy, determination, courage, and military capability.

The Second Army, commanded by Alexander Samsonov, was mobilized from the Warsaw Military District, and consisted of five infantry corps and four cavalry divisions.

The Russian supply of cable was insufficient to run telephone or telegraph connections from the rear; all they had was needed for field communications.

His problems were compounded because an intercepted wireless message disclosed that the Russian II Army included five Corps and a cavalry division, and aerial scouts saw their columns marching across the frontier.

On the afternoon of 22 August, the head of the Eighth Army field railways was informed by telegraph that new commanders were coming by special train.

[29] The new commanders arrived at Marienburg on the afternoon of 23 August; they had met for the first time on their special train the previous night and now they rendezvoused with the Eighth Army staff.

The German 1st Cavalry Division and some garrison troops of older men would remain as a screen just south of the eastern edge of the Königsberg defenses, facing Rennenkampf's First Army.

The bulk of the Second Russian Army was still coming towards the front; if necessary, they would be allowed to push further into the province while the German reinforcements assembled on the flanks, poised to encircle the invaders—just the tactics instilled by Schlieffen.

The Russians followed, and on the 24th they attacked again; the now partially entrenched XX Corps temporarily stopped their advance before retreating to avoid possible encirclement.

He ordered most of his units to the northwest, toward the Vistula, leaving only his VI Corps to continue north towards their original objective of Seeburg.

[37] On 24 August Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Hoffmann motored along the German lines to meet Scholtz and his principal subordinates, sharing the roads with panic-stricken refugees; in the background were columns of smoke from burning villages ignited by artillery shells.

[41] Zhilinskiy was visited by the commander of the Russian Army, the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich of Russia, who ordered him to support Samsonov.

XVII Corps had endured long marches in sweltering weather, but some men still had the energy to pursue on bicycles requisitioned from civilians.

It is surprising that misgivings filled many a heart, that firm resolution began to yield to vacillation, and that doubts crept in where a clear vision had hitherto prevailed?

Basil Gourko, commanding the Russian First Army Cavalry Division (and from 1916 to 1917 chief of the general staff), was told later that Samsonov was not aware of what was happening on his flanks because he was observing the action from a rise in the ground a distance from his wireless set and reports were not relayed to him.

[48][page needed] On the morning of 28 August the German commanders were motoring along the front when they were shown a report from an aerial observer that Rennenkampf's army was moving towards their rear.

The German 3rd Reserve Division was also able to advance on the Russian XV Corps, forcing Samsonov to order a retreat to Neidenburg.

One half of the German encirclement was complete by the end of the day, as Ludendorff wrote, "The enemy front seemed to be breaking up... We did not have a clear picture of the situation with individual units.

Hindenburg wrote and spoke of "we", and when questioned about the crucial tête-à-tête with Ludendorff after dinner on 26 August resolutely maintained that they had calmly discussed their options and resolved to continue with the encirclement.

Military historian Walter Elze wrote that a few months before his death Hindenburg finally acknowledged that Ludendorff had been in a state of panic that evening.

[70] The battle is at the center of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's novel August 1914, published in 1971, and is featured in the video games Darkest of Days and Tannenberg.