After the Battle of Flers–Courcelette (15–22 September) the Anglo-French armies tried to press their advantage with smaller attacks in quick succession, rather than pausing to regroup and give the Germans time to recover.

[1] On 3 November, Major-General Rudolph Cavan the XIV Corps commander, wrote to Rawlinson, objecting to the renewal of attacks on Le Transloy, having already lost 5,320 casualties.

Haig explained that the Fourth Army would be attacking at other points on 5 November and Cavan agreed to make certain that the French left flank was protected.

Opinion among divisional and brigade commanders varied on the possibility of an attack and that it should go ahead or be cancelled rather than be postponed again; patrols were sent out frequently to report on the state of the ground.

[9] Gough planned to attack on 13 November, with five divisions from II and V Corps astride the Ancre river, which flowed between Thiepval and Beaumont Hamel.

[b] Gough intended to reduce the head of the German salient between Thiepval and Serre, the main effort coming from V Corps with the 63rd, 51st, 2nd and 3rd divisions, against positions north of the Ancre, which had not been seriously attacked since 1 July.

Lieutenant-General Claud Jacob the II Corps commander protested against the plan and was over-ruled, despite patrols from the 19th Division finding Germans repairing the wire of the Grandcourt line.

Work was ordered to build new defensive strongpoints to shelter troops in reserve and then connect them into lines, the rear of the 5th Ersatz Division to be strengthened to make a possible British attack from Miraumont to Pys a slow and costly advance.

Constant shelling and wet weather exhausted the German troops and cut off the flow of supplies until 11 November, when the British shellfire eased.

On 6 November, Below and Lossberg the 1st Army Chief of Staff, concluded that the Ancre–Serre salient was too dangerous to hold, due to artillery fire from the flank and rear and Below contemplated a withdrawal to Lesbœufs.

[16] The seven-day bombardment cut the wire on most of the attack front and destroyed many German defensive positions, except the dugouts built deep below the villages near the front-line.

[24] Six minutes before zero, the leading battalion of the right brigade moved beyond the British wire and advanced when the new 30,000 lb (13 long tons; 14 t) mine at Hawthorn Crater was blown, passed the east end of Y Ravine and reached the first objective at 6:45 a.m., with a stray party from the 63rd Division.

The left brigade was held up in places by uncut wire, south of Hawthorn Crater and massed machine-gun fire north of the Auchonvillers–Beaumont Hamel road.

Waist-deep mud caused a fiasco; some troops from the 8th Brigade reached the German support line, then fell back and some lost direction.

Artillery co-operation worked well on 16 November when area calls from 4, 7 and 15 Squadron aircraft led to "devastating" fire on trenches full of German infantry.

The railway junction at Hirson 90 mi (140 km) away, was bombed by 27 Squadron, attacking from 1,000 ft (300 m), hitting coaches, wagons in sidings and two station buildings.

On 18 November, the final day of the ground operation, a thaw set in and rain and snow reduced visibility, making it impossible for British troops to be seen, even at low level.

On the right the 57th Brigade advance reached German positions west of Stump road on the boundary of the 18th Division and pressed on before being cut off and taken prisoner; 70 British troops managing to escape much later on.

The left battalion of the division was to capture Baillescourt Farm on the north bank of the Ancre but one company was stopped by machine-gun fire from Grandcourt, as the other advanced along the railway embankment and sent out a patrol which met one from V Corps.

One battalion began early, advanced down Lager Alley, with its left on Serre Trench and descended the valley towards the village which some troops reached, although most were captured or killed during the day.

[48] After a quiet night, the 23rd Division troops from Infantry Regiment 62 at Beaumont Hamel, stood to at dawn in the fog and were surprised by the arrival of the post, which reduced tension; sentries then reported many footfalls in no man's land.

[49] Signal rockets were fired for the artillery but in the fog went unseen and the rest were thrown into no-man's-land to illuminate the British as they drew close, many of them falling into German trenches as they were shot.

[51] On the north bank, the survivors of IR55 made a stand in the Schloss-stellung on the west side of Beaucourt, running towards Alt-Wurttemburgfeste (Old Württemberg Redoubt) from which, with part of the 223rd Division, they devastated two British battalions advancing closer to the river; its reserve regiment was rushed to Serre Riegel early on 14 November.

A battalion moved up on the south bank of the river then crossed an improvised bridge to occupy Puisieux Trench but no counter-attack could be organised amid the chaos.

By the evening, German defenders held ground either side of the road, in an arc between Dessauer Riegel and the east end of Regina Trench.

[63] A 1st Army investigation of the débâcle at Beaumont Hamel found that the weeks of bombardment, lately from the flank and rear, had destroyed the German trenches and wire, although in the front line, most dugouts, 20–26 ft (6–8 m) deep, survived.

The real attack began after 15 minutes of Trommelfeuer (drumfire); the German defensive barrage failed to have much effect, due to visibility being nil in the fog, leaving the infantry unsupported.

During the writing of the Official History volume in 1938, Kiggell recounted that he had suggested the attack and had remarked that a "cheap" success would counter rumoured hostility from Lloyd George, just before the conference due on 15 November, as "an afterthought".

James Edmonds, the official historian, amended Miles' text to make Kiggell the origin of the political calculation, give due emphasis to operational considerations and deference to the tactical judgement of Gough by Haig and Kiggell[66] In 2005, Prior and Wilson claimed that Gough had been put in an invidious position and that having the meeting recorded by his Chief of Staff Neil Malcolm, was "unprecedented".

Philpott contradicted Prior and Wilson and their claim that the War Committee had ignored Haig's "flights of fancy" and wrote that in October the battle "still had potential".