[8] After the declaration of war, RAF Bomber Command began operations against Nazi Germany but limited their attacks to those targets that were purely military and had little risk of civilian casualties.

They were also marked by a lack of coordination and minor issues like bad weather and communication problems that meant none of these early operations was very intense.

This belief was reinforced by the success of the Battle of France, which meant that opposing air forces were pushed too far away for effective bombing attacks on the German homeland.

By the time they began reorganising defences to combat continued RAF raids and also the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) strategic bombing campaign, they were already engaged in a war of attrition for which they were not prepared.

The RAF lacked a four-engine bomber with adequate defensive protection which could carry heavy bomb loads to German targets.

[10] The Netherlands and Belgium wished to remain neutral and refused to allow the RAF to establish bases, to fly deeper into Germany.

[10][11][12] To fit in with this strategy, the initial plans of the RAF involved raids against German shipping on receipt of the results of aerial reconnaissance.

The radio failed and an attack could not be launched until McPherson returned to base, when 15 Handley Page Hampdens and nine Vickers Wellington bombers were sent against the German ships.

[17][18] Admiral Scheer was hit by three bombs that failed to explode, while the light cruiser Emden—not one of the priority targets—was present and also damaged by a Blenheim that crashed into the forecastle of the ship.

Gruppe of JG 77; II Wing, Fighter Group 77, Oberstleutnant Carl-August Schumacher) took off from Nordholz Airbase and intercepted 9 Squadron.

[32] Coordination was not helped by the poor relations between the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine Commanders-in-Chief, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring and Großadmiral (Grand Admiral) Erich Raeder.

Fighter units defending the North Sea coast were subordinated to Luftgaukommando XI (Air District Command 11) in Hanover.

Schumacher had served in the Kaiserliche Marine (Imperial German Navy) during the First World War and as an officer cadet had seen combat at the Battle of Jutland.

The lack of action during the Phoney War period meant that these aircraft, usually in demand by offensive air fleets (Luftflotte), were available for defensive roles.

Warnings were given by the Spitfire pilots that they could have decimated the squadron within ten minutes because of their poor formation flying and lack of fighter escort but were ignored.

[38] On the morning of 18 December 1939, The Times of London published the story of the Battle of the River Plate and the demise of Admiral Graf Spee and a few hours later RAF Bomber Command attempted to sink another major warship.

The remaining bombers flew north past the Frisian Islands then turned due south, continuing their mission in perfect visibility which made it easy to be spotted by German aircraft.

On the island of Wangerooge, Leutnant Hermann Diehl of Regiment 3, battery LN-Vers was demonstrating the Freya set to a visiting naval officer.

[41] Falck's aircraft was severely damaged, forcing him to disengage but he managed to glide back to base and make a "dead-stick" landing without power.

German historians have claimed that official British figures were tampered with to hide losses but careful examination of the records reveals no deception.

Hewitt called this action an "unforgivable crime", although Harris later stated that this was unfair, as Guthrie and Hue-Williams were untrained and had never faced the enemy before.

At the time, the RAF was using the Course Setting Bomb Sight (CSBS), originally developed in World War I for aircraft flying at much lower speeds against poorly defended targets.

At an already-scheduled meeting on 22 December 1939, Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt noted that the CSBS demanded that the aircraft fly a straight path for a relatively long period of time prior to the drop, which made it difficult to attack targets of opportunity, as well as making it easier for the anti-aircraft gunners which were attacking non-maneuvering targets.

The German report also regarded the attempt by the RAF to attack in clear conditions and perfect visibility at altitudes of 10,000–16,000 ft (3,000–4,900 m) as "criminal folly".

[59] Schumacher stated that anti-aircraft fire proved effective at breaking up formations and damaging bombers which provided better opportunities for the fighter pilots.

The historian for the Luftwaffe General Staff noted it was only exploited for propaganda, despite the operational problems and warnings the battle had flagged for attacker and defender.

[1] This run of events and the knowledge that the RAF was only capable of short penetrations over France in daylight, led the Luftwaffe to believe Germany was invulnerable to attack.

[63] By the time Germany declared war on the United States, on 11 December 1941, the failure of Operation Barbarossa meant the Luftwaffe's method of concentrating all its resources on the front line was failing.

Hans Jeschonnek summed up the attitude of the OKL when he stated that the Luftwaffe could deal with the Western Allies' daylight raids with "one" fighter wing.

Adolf Galland—General der Jagdflieger (General of the Fighter Force), 1941–1945—gave lack of organisation and of planning for air defence as one of the greatest mistakes made by the Luftwaffe during the war.