Battle of the Southern Carpathians

The brainchild of German General Erich von Falkenhayn, the operation consisted in an attempt by the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) to assault all of the passes in the Southern Carpathians at the same time, and exploit a success wherever it might have come.

Following the Battle of Transylvania, German General Erich von Falkenhayn, commander of the 9th Army, devised a plan to break through the Romanian defenses in the Southern Carpathians.

[8] Having retaken the initiative in this sector of the front, the Romanians pressed on their attack and - on the following day (28 October) - recaptured the village of Lerești.

The Romanian defenders in the region consisted in the I Corps of the 1st Army, at the time under the command of General Ioan Culcer.

Although the Central Powers made good initial progress, they were counterattacked by the Romanians on 19 October at Sălătrucu, most of their gains being subsequently reversed.

[11][12] A mostly-German force, represented primarily by the 11th Bavarian Infantry Division, launched an invasion of Oltenia on 23 October, resulting in the First Battle of the Jiu Valley.

The attempt however failed, as the Romanians stopped the Germans and rolled back most of their gains in a counterattack which lasted from 27 October to 1 November.

These had advanced through the Oituz Pass to the border, but had then been halted by the Romanian 15th Infantry Division, under General Eremia Grigorescu.

Although heroic efforts by the 82nd Austrian (Szekler) Regiment salvaged the situation for the Central Powers on the 25th, the advance in the Oituz Pass had come to a halt.

[22] Falkenhayn's original intention - to apply pressure at several points across the Southern Carpathians and exploit a success wherever it was achieved - had not succeeded.

Falkenhayn subsequently decided to break the deadlock by forcing the Western end of the Romanian line, launching the Second Battle of the Jiu Valley.

He reasoned that this was the route through the mountains where substantial forces could be deployed, as the valleys elsewhere were too narrow for the Germans to make best use of their superiority in firepower.

Romanian resistance, coupled with poor infrastructure, unfavorable weather and rugged terrain, caused Falkehayn to achieve yet another "ordinary victory" instead of a "Cannae".

The German operations plan, drawn up by General Gerhard Tappen, envisioned the complete destruction of the Romanian Army via a series of encirclement battles.

In order for Falkenhyan to win a complete victory at the earliest possible moment, it was necessary to force the passes in the center of the Carpathian arc.

[26] General Curt von Morgen, a subordinate of Falkenhayn, argued that much more of the Romanian Army could have been captured if a breakthrough would have been achieved at Câmpulung (south of the Bran Pass).