Alerted that a German attack south of Lake Balaton was imminent, Marshal Tolbukhin deployed additional artillery units to reinforce the 57th Army and the Bulgarian III Corps.

With three infantry divisions (the 16th was redeployed to assist the IV Corps) aided by a thaw that caused muddy ground, the Bulgarians held as did the 57th Army.

[8] The 133rd Rifle Corps, reinforced by Soviet artillery units and supported by ground-attack aircraft, subsequently took up positions at the critical junction of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav forces.

Realizing the 2nd Panzer Army was not going to break through on its front and under pressure from the Soviets and Bulgarians, the Germans evacuated the bridgehead across the Drava at Donji Miholjac during March 18–20, 1945.

[7] Near Valpovo, the German 11th Luftwaffe Field Division, supported by two regiments of dismounted Cossacks, crossed the Drava and pushed about two kilometers to the northeast by March 8.

The success of the Bulgarians, Soviets, and Yugoslavs during the combat in the Transdanubian Hills led to a failure of the planned German advance in the region and helped prepare the Vienna Offensive of the Red Army.

[4] The overall conduct of Operation Spring Awakening has also been criticized because of the German failure to deploy the stronger units of the 6th SS Panzer Army against the relatively weak Soviet and Bulgarian defenses south of Lake Balaton.

[11] The 6th SS Panzer Army was instead deployed north of Lake Balaton in an area the Hungarian military warned was unsuitable for an armored attack.