[4] The scheme allows the correctness of an election result to be verifiably proved relying only on the integrity of the in-booth random number generators (hence "trusted"); the proof of correctness does not rely on, still less need to prove, the integrity of the electronic voting machines themselves.
One special requirement, however, to prevent fraudulent challenges to the election result, is the use of unforgeable paper for the receipts.
The voting machine issues the voter with a printed receipt listing the candidates and their assigned random numbers.
Voters can assure themselves that their vote was counted by finding their receipt in the published list of ballots.
[7] In a real-life test, a student parliament election, the authors used modified smart card readers as the random number generators.
[5] One of the authors makes the point that a separate random number generator can be more effectively protected from manipulation than can a voting machine.
A 2012 PhD thesis[7] by Christian Henrich at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, supervised by one of the original authors, Jörn Müller-Quade, proposes a number of changes and enhancements to Bingo voting: and offers an analysis of the improved method's security and usability.
Another 2012 paper, by Carmen Kempka, also a researcher at KIT, proposes an extension to Bingo voting to support write-in candidates without impairing verification of correctness or coercion resistance, although it relies on a trusted authority.