The dispute began in 1992 and involved a series of negotiations and maritime incidents, before being finally settled in 1997 through the Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet.

It was of symbolic importance for Russia, in order to project its power on its southern flank in relation to Turkey, the Caucasus and the future Caspian oil flows.

The Black Sea Fleet, according to the think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies, numbered some 45 surface warships, 28 submarines and 300 other vessels, plus 151 combat fixed-wing aircraft and 85 helicopters.

As Ukraine moved closer towards creating its own military, it led to the issue of ownership of Black Sea Fleet surfacing in the relations of two countries.

After reaching an agreement on splitting the fleet, the issue of the allocation of bases surfaced and became the most contentious one, which led to even wider dispute of the sovereignty over Crimea.

[8] The discussions over the ownership of Black Sea Fleet created tensions not only between Russia and Ukraine, but within these states themselves, particularly between executives, legislatures and strong interest groups, such as armed forces, which often voiced differing opinions.

[12][13][14][11] The view that the fleet was CIS property was initially shared by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, and was also supported by Crimean president Yuri Meshkov in 1994, who said that the issue of Black Sea Fleet ownership should be resolved based on interests of all CIS states, along with the wishes of Crimean population and authorities.

In April 1994, the Ukrainian ambassador to Moscow said that Ukraine could claim 16% of the whole Soviet navy, which was more than the Black Sea Fleet, based on its assumption of 16.4% of the USSR's debt.

Anton Buteyko, the foreign affairs advisor to the Ukrainian President, said that Ukraine could claim 20 to 25 percent based on its supposed contribution to the building and maintaining the Soviet navy.

[20] At the same time, both sides made statements connecting the Black Sea Fleet to their national identities, invoking historical traditions.

President of Russia Boris Yeltsin voiced his opposition to Ukraine's control of Black Sea Fleet, and called servicemen not to swear oath.

[29] As the negotiations stalled, on 7 April, Kravchued decreed the beginning of formation of organs to manage Ukraine's own navy on the basis on Black Sea Fleet.

[30] Boris Yeltsin countered by adopting his own decree on placing the Black Sea Fleet under Russia's jurisdiction and ordering its ships to raise the St. Andrews flag, an old symbol of Russian navy.

Dimitri Pavlichko, the head of a Ukrainian parliamentary commission on foreign affairs, said, "If we look at this in formal terms, Yeltsin's decree puts Ukraine in a state of war with Russia.

[32] However, further tensions were averted as a result of two telephone calls between Kravchuk and Yeltsin, with both of them agreeing to suspend their decrees and to set up commission for the purpose of dividing fleet.

Russia and Ukraine signed a general agreement on friendly ties and agreed to start negotiations on a new political treaty to confirm this relationship.

[38][39][40][41] However, the tensions flared up soon on 22 July 1992, when the Black Sea Fleet coast guard frigate armed with torpedoes, two cannons and depth charges raised the Ukrainian flag and headed from a training exercise in Donuzlav to Odessa without permission.

The former commander of the fleet spoke out against the split, warning that it would allow Turkish navy to "attain exclusive domination in the Black Sea" in two or three years.

The vote also appeared to be connected to the Ukrainian Parliament's decision to declare ownership of disputed 176 nuclear missiles on its territory inherited from the USSR on 2 July.

[56] Russian President Boris Yeltsin said that he was "ashamed" of the Supreme Soviet's claim on Sevastopol, and made it clear that Russia would not make a move on city.

The agreement stipulated that Ukraine would give all or part of its share of the former Black Sea Fleet in exchange for relief from the crushing debt.

Kravchuk said that Ukraine "did not need" its share anyway and was planning to sell it, but Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament's foreign relations committee, spoke against the agreement by saying that "Couldn't we have found other buyers?

[66] These incidents alarmed both sides and on 12 April 1994, the negotiations resumed, with Russia being given nominal 80-85% share in exchange for undisclosed compensation for Ukraine.

Being more open to compromise, Kuchma issued a joint letter with Yeltsin, pledging to take into account the opinions of personnel and the residents of Crimea in the future accords.

[76][77] Although the Sochi accord was described as breakthrough, the Union of Officers of Ukraine called for annulling it, accusing Kuchma of "surrendering to Yeltsin's demands".

Sevastopol was leased to Russia for 20 years, while Ukraine agreed to have its navy participate in joint operational-strategic exercises with the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

In April 1992, Georgia made it apparent that it was interested to secure control over the part of the fleet located in its ports in Poti and Ochamchire.

The Georgian government proposed to divide the fleet either equally among Ukraine, Georgia and Russia, or proportionally based on the extent of coastline of each state.

Russian deputy foreign minister rejected Georgian claims on the fleet, saying that the decision to divide it was taken in January 1992 through the CIS while Georgia was not part of it.

Russian Defense Council secretary Iurii Baturin said that the value of the Poti base which was handed over to Georgia far exceeded that of the vessels previously stationed there, satisfying all possible Georgian claims on the fleet.