Bray sent him a letter, and circulated it to others, saying, “Sir, during last summer, as you are aware, it came to my knowledge that whilst holding the fiduciary position of vice-chairman of the Yorkshire College you were illegally and improperly, as you know, making profit as its paid solicitor.” This was held to be libellous by the jury at trial.

But Cave J had directed the jury that the College’s articles did in fact allow for pay of services as a solicitor.

Prior to 1878, in which year he entered into partnership with another solicitor, he made a present of his time and labour to the college.

The letter commenced by stating that the respondent, whilst holding the fiduciary position of vice-chairman of the college, had been illegally and improperly, as he knew, making profit as its paid solicitor.

At the trial it was contended that the respondent was, by virtue of the fourth clause of the college's memorandum of association, entitled to receive remuneration for his services, notwithstanding the position he held as vice-chairman of the council.

I regard it rather as based on the consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather than by duty, and thus prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect.

They thought, as I understand, that the nature of the libel was such that the jury would have been entitled to give, and would probably have given, the same verdict, even if the direction of the learned judge had been the other way.

But in the case of an action for libel, not only have the parties a right to trial by jury, but the assessment of damages is peculiarly within the province of that tribunal.

The Court may think, as I might think in the case before your Lordships, that the jury would have given the same damages if the law had been correctly expounded; but this is a mere matter of speculation: it cannot be asserted with the least certainty that they would have done so.

I find it impossible to say that the case upon which the jury ought to have adjudicated ever was wholly before them, and that they were allowed to give to all the circumstances which might legitimately have influenced the verdict their due weight.