Brazilian Army in the First Republic

In the long run, the strengthening of the army's leadership and the expansion of the concept of national defense, initiated in this period, allowed for military interventions by generals that occurred later in Brazilian history, such as the 1937 coup d'état.

[3] They came from the small educated portion of the population, but still from the middle strata, with no money to pay for a law or medical school for their children; some were from traditional military families.

[5] Officers were not apolitical: bonuses and bribes helped to co-opt senior officials, who worked politically through appointments and promotions and sometimes used their prestige to win elections.

[12] On paper there were still units of the National Guard, subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, with officers formed by local political elites, whose soldiers were men under their command.

[20] The greatest threat to the new regime was the Federalist Revolution of 1893–1895, when Rio Grande do Sul entered a state of civil war, which spread to Santa Catarina and Paraná and connected to the second navy revolt, which started in the capital.

[31] The officers' consensus in the early 20th century was that their force was inefficient and backward, with low budgets, poor facilities, and uneven weaponry making training and maintenance difficult.

[34] For the political scientist José Murilo de Carvalho, the First Brazilian Republic was marked by "the army's intense struggle to become a national organization capable of effectively planning and executing a defense policy in its broadest sense".

[39] In addition to comparing themselves to European standards, Brazilian reformists followed similar changes in the armies of Argentina and Chile,[40] preferred customers of Germany.

Only after the administration of João Nepomuceno de Medeiros Mallet in the Ministry of War (1898–1902) did a continuous movement of reforms in all aspects of the institution began, but budgetary resources were still scarce.

[41] In 1905, general Hermes da Fonseca, commander of the 4th Military District in Rio de Janeiro, carried out the first major field maneuvers since the beginning of the republic in Santa Cruz.

Fonseca visited Germany in 1908, watching the maneuvers of the Imperial German Army, recognized at the time for the modernity of its General Staff and war technology.

[51] Several members of this group joined the General Staff of the Army and the cabinet of Minister of War José Caetano de Faria (1914–1918), who favored reformist ideas.

[54] Attention was more on Europe than on Contestado; Brazilian officers watched the "two model armies, the German and the French one, test men, equipment, organization, strategies and tactics against each other".

[58] Assimilating the novelties of warfare in Europe was a necessity accepted by minister Caetano de Faria, but he was skeptical about the importation of a European model (even if adapted to Brazil) through a mission of foreign instructors.

Brazilian officers complained about the divisional organization intended by the French, with numerous and heavy artillery, designed for a war of industrial powers with a dense rail network.

To make matters worse, general Gamelin represented a static doctrine that would be defeated when he commanded the French Armed Forces in the Battle of France in 1940.

[94] In an ideal division of labor, the head of the EME would handle the day-to-day affairs of the army, while the Minister of War would negotiate with Congress, seek funding, and resolve other political issues.

Outside the brigades were battalions and companies of caçadores (hunters),[c] regiments of independent cavalry, and other units responsible for the security and defense of regions without strategic forces.

The force was divided into permanent and variable elements, respectively consisting of career officers (with some enlisted men) and soldiers who returned to civilian life after a short period.

[150] In the early years of the republic, there were two types of officers, "bachelors in uniform", trained in artillery or engineering at the Military School of Praia Vermelha (EMPV), and "tarimbeiros", with minor courses in infantry and cavalry or none at all.

[186] Still, young officers trained to European standards felt better prepared than their superiors, and indeed, the lieutenants of the 1920s were "the most technically professional rebels the army has ever faced", in the definition of historian Frank McCann.

[191] The shortage of personnel was felt during the conflicts of the 1890s, requiring measures such as the recruitment of hundreds of ensigns among the civilian population, the commissioning of soldiers as officers and the mobilization of patriotic battalions.

Small and medium caliber ammunition was produced at the cartridge factory, in Realengo, and at the war arsenal in Rio de Janeiro, but it was still necessary to import, especially from the United States.

[228] The 1918 ministerial report pointed out the lack of barracks for several units, such as the 8th Battalion of Caçadores, headquartered in small houses rented by the city hall, and the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, in low thatched huts.

[229] In Rio de Janeiro, military installations, some used by the army since the 18th century, were concentrated in the center and coast during the Brazilian Empire, but since 1850 there was an interiorization of the barracks, motivated by the appreciation of real estate, the need for open spaces to train new maneuvers and armaments and the defense of reserves of war material.

[233] It broke with the barrack building tradition of the previous century and incorporated modern principles of planning, circulation, hygiene, zoning, and standardization, as well as demonstrating the officers' place in society.

The works were delegated to the country's private initiative, mainly the Construction Company of Santos, by Roberto Simonsen, at an estimated cost of 23 million dollars, financed by public bonds.

The construction program significantly improved the material conditions of the barracks, brought the Brazilian Army and State to new places and developed the infrastructure of the municipalities where it was carried out.

[231][241] War ministers such as Fernando Setembrino de Carvalho (1922–1926) and Nestor Sezefredo dos Passos (1926–1930) supported modernization and accepted the army as a strong arm of the Brazilian political elite.

Elaborated by military thinkers such as Bertoldo Klinger and Góis Monteiro, this doctrine provided for the political action of the High Command, with all the weight of the institution at its disposal.