The area is a heartland of Vietnamese Buddhism, and at the time, activist Buddhist monks and civilians were at the forefront of opposition to a series of military juntas that had been ruling the nation, as well as prominently questioning the escalation of the Vietnam War.

The Kỳ-Thiệu regime was initially almost a feudal system, being more of an alliance of warlords than a state as each corps commander ruled his area as his own fiefdom, handing some of the taxes they collected over to the government in Saigon and keeping the rest for themselves.

Meanwhile, Thi stayed in I Corps and did not leave; strikes and protests stopped civilian activity in the area, government radio stations were taken over and used for anti-Kỳ campaigning, and military operations ceased.

Kỳ moved military forces into the city and travelled there to prepare for an assault, but had to withdraw and then start discussions with Buddhist leaders, as it was obvious that he was not strong enough to crush the opposition.

In the meantime, he fired Thi's successor Nguyễn Văn Chuân because he wanted a firmer attempt to regain control, and appointed Tôn Thất Đính to replace him.

Kỳ's triumph ended the Buddhist movement's influence on politics and he confined their leader Thích Trí Quang to house arrest thereafter, while Thi left for the United States.

[22][23] However, the standoff persisted, and in August, the ARVN Special Forces of Colonel Lê Quang Tung, loyal to Diệm's brother and chief adviser Ngô Đình Nhu, raided temples across the country, killing an estimated hundreds and arresting thousands of Buddhist laypeople and monks.

[34] The historian Stanley Karnow said of Kỳ and Thi: "Both flamboyant characters who wore gaudy uniforms and sported sinister moustaches, the two young officers had been friends, and their rivalry seemed to typify the personal struggles for power that chronically afflicted South Vietnam.

If Kỳ thought that Thích Trí Quang would not organize demonstrations against Thi's dismissal, he turned out to be wrong, as the monk used the crisis to highlight Buddhist calls for civilian rule.

[43] General Westmoreland, US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., and the Defense Secretary Robert McNamara were supportive of the Kỳ-Thiệu regime and their prosecution of the war against the communists, and they opposed Thi, regarding him as not being firm enough against communism.

However, the unrest steadily grew, as civil servants, disaffected military personnel, and the working under-class, in part upset with the economic problems, joined the anti-government demonstrations.

[44] Meanwhile, in the capital in mid-to-late March, Kỳ took the lead in trying to dampen discontent, meeting Buddhist leaders and promising elections and social reform; however, he also warned that street demonstrations would be suppressed.

The administrator at Da Nang's radio station allowed the Thi supporters to make a broadcaster when only ten student protesters turned up, a minuscule amount of popular pressure.

[48] On the public holiday that commemorates Emperor Hung Vuong, the legendary founder of Vietnam, Saigon's Buddhists used a trick to stage protests against Kỳ and Thiệu's junta.

However, a few thousand people turned up to the event and then erected pictures of Kỳ and the senior junta generals on the posts used for public executions, adding a poster that read: "This is the plaza of demagogy.

[47] The protests were at their most violent in the capital Saigon, where pro-Buddhist students rioted, using bicycle chains and sticks as weapons, vandalised cars, threw rocks and shouted anti-American slogans.

[47] Street battles erupted between Kỳ's loyalist police and troops, as the dissidents fought tear gas with rocks, homemade spears, glass bottles and sometimes a hand grenade.

Often the protesters wore makeshift masks made of plastic bags and threw tear gas canisters back at the police and military, and regardless of who was on the receiving end, this often necessitated momentary retreats due to eye irritation.

[49] During the unrest of early April, the Buddhists called for a constitution, for the junta to hand power to an elected civilian executive and legislature, which Kỳ had repeatedly promised to honour in the future.

[47] Having miscalculated in his deployment of marines and paratroopers to Da Nang for a show of force, the humiliated Kỳ arrived back in Saigon, where he met with Buddhist leaders for negotiations.

The Buddhists demanded an amnesty for rioters and mutinous soldiers, and for Kỳ to withdraw the marines from Da Nang back to Saigon where they formed part of the strategic reserve.

[52] There Americans were publicly pretending to be uninvolved in the Vietnamese dispute, Secretary of State Dean Rusk saying "This is in part an effort by some civilian groups to carve out a certain position in relation to the steps that have been announced for some time by the military government to move toward a constitutional system.

[54] The Struggle Movement commanded wide support in South Vietnam, with a demonstration in Saigon being attended by thousands of people, including many Catholic leaders and by soldiers of the ARVN 1st Division.

[55] Johnson's National Security Adviser, Walt Whitman Rostow gave Johnson an analogy from Russian history, stating the Struggle Movement were the Vietnamese equivalents of Right Socialist Revolutionary Alexander Kerensky while the Viet Cong were the equivalent of Vladimir Lenin's Bolsheviks; Rostow argued that just as Kerensky was unable to prevent the overthrow of the Provisional Government in 1917 by the Bolsheviks, so too would the Struggle Movement being unable to stop the Viet Cong from overthrowing them if they should come to power.

[42] Kỳ felt that General Tôn Thất Đính's aggressive attitude following the Xá Lợi Pagoda raids staged under the Diệm regime in 1963 indicated a willingness to suppress Buddhist dissidents.

[56] On April 19, clashes erupted in Quảng Ngãi between the Buddhists and the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (VNQDĐ, Vietnamese Nationalist Party), who supported the continuation of the anti-communist war, prompting Đính to forcibly restrain the two groups.

[60] The next day, Cao, accompanied by Colonel Archelaus L. Hamblen, the senior U.S. Army advisor in I Corps, and Brigadier general Jonas M. Platt, Chief of Staff to III MAF, flew to Huế to visit the headquarters of ARVN 1st Division.

Cao, refused, fearing for his family's safety, and asked Westmoreland for asylum in America, saying that he wanted "to become an American citizen, to join the Marines or Army, to fight against the Communists" after returning to Vietnam.

The Buddhist activist leader Thích Trí Quang, went on a hunger strike, denouncing American support for the Kỳ-Thiệu junta, which he viewed as inappropriate interference in domestic affairs.

[25] In mid June, the Saigon-based Buddhist leader Thich Tam Chau, regarded as being more moderate than Quang, called for passive resistance instead of rioting, and denounced any peace talks with the communists as a "surrender".