[5] The boats could dive 200 ft (61 m) and unlike modern submarines, the main ballast and trim tanks were located internally.

[9] After sea trials, the submarines now named Iquique and Antofogasta[5] were refused by the Chilean officials as they had failed to achieve the radius of action demanded in the contract.

Paterson, the president of the Seattle Construction and Drydock Company, revealed that his firm was willing to sell the two submarines that had recently been completed.

After speaking with several local stakeholders, McBride informed the Government of Canada and the Naval Service (Royal Canadian Navy) that there were two submarines for sale and that they should purchase them for the offered price of $575,000 each.

While awaiting their response, McBride agreed to buy the submarines using funds from the government of British Columbia.

[8] On the eve of the First World War, the two submarines left Seattle at 2200 hours on 3 August 1914, sneaking out of harbour as the clearance papers for the two boats had not been obtained at the time.

[8] The next day, the United States Navy dispatched the cruiser USS Milwaukee to search for the submarines, however by the time the ship reached the area where they had been, the two boats were gone.

Initially heralded by Prime Minister Robert Borden as a masterstroke, rumours began to circulate about problems developing on the submarines and the exorbitant cost the Government of British Columbia, and then Canada, had paid and that Paterson, the president of Seattle Construction, had pocketed a large commission.

[11] The Royal Commission headed by Sir Charles Davidson, heard from Philip Watts, the former director of naval construction for the Royal Navy and advisor to the Chilean government regarding the initial design of the submarines, through his letter to the Admiralty during the initial process of acquisition.

[13] Electric Boat Company had admitted to that the submarines had displayed dangerous diving characteristics and had been in the process of developing alterations to the design when the ships were purchased by the Canadian government.

[15] The defence of the decision lay in the timing of the deal, the eventual US neutrality, and the Admiralty recommendation to purchase the boats when they had been informed.

[11] After commissioning, though without torpedoes, because those had yet to arrive from the east coast, CC-2 was deployed on 13 August 1914 to the Strait of Juan de Fuca as a deterrent to the German raider threat.

This required a reduction in weight which led to the removal of all unnecessary stores, fuel and spare parts.

Off Cape Blanco, the fleet ran into a gale and CC-2 rolled heavily in the seas, seawater contaminating the sub's batteries.

Confined to port-hopping down the coast and passing through the Canal Zone, the fleet had to stop at Kingston, Jamaica to make repairs.

They left again and hit a storm, the fleet limping into Norfolk, Virginia, where the submarines spent two weeks in the US Navy dockyard.

CC-1 was towed by Shearwater to Newport, Rhode Island where after another six days of repair, the fleet set out to finish the transit, arriving at Halifax, Nova Scotia on 17 October 1917.

[21] However, the Admiralty insisted that the submarines be made ready for duty in Europe and ordered them to refuel and proceed to the Mediterranean Sea.

[24] The Royal Canadian Navy then devised a plan to utilise the two subs in anti-submarine training for the surface vessels.