CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1993] UKHL 7 (21 October 1993) is a decision of the House of Lords relating to undue influence.

As a result, he embarked on a course of conduct putting pressure on Mrs Pitt which the trial judge held amounted to actual undue influence.

It offered a loan of £150,000 for 19 years secured on the family home and also on a policy of assurance to be effected by Mr Pitt on his life.

At the time of the trial in July 1992, the total sum owing under the legal charge was nearly £219,000, which exceeded the value of the family home.

After reviewing the background, his Lordship focussed his analysis on two key points: (1) whether "manifest disadvantage" needed to be demonstrated, and (2) whether CIBC, as a third party, was on notice of any undue influence.

After reviewing all of the relevant case law, Lord Browne-Wilkinson concluded that there was no requirement to demonstrate manifest disadvantage where actual (as opposed to presumed) undue influence was established.

In the circumstances, I do not think that this House can have been intending to lay down any general principle applicable to all claims of undue influence, whether actual or presumed."

Actual undue influence is a species of fraud.Having made that determination Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that Mrs Pitt would have been entitled to set aside the transaction against her husband.

The trial judge had found as a fact that Mr Pitt was not the agent of CIBC, and so his knowledge of the undue influence could not be imputed to the bank.

However, there was nothing in the fact pattern which did so: So far as the plaintiff [CIBC] was aware, the transaction consisted of a joint loan to husband and wife to finance the discharge of an existing mortgage on 26 Alexander Avenue, and as to the balance to be applied in buying a holiday home.

The judgment was delivered on the same day as the House of Lords decision in Barclays Bank plc v O'Brien [1993] UKHL 6 (21 October 1993).

Accordingly, the decision in Pitt is normally only cited today by textbooks as supplementary authority for more general propositions, such as the absence of any requirement for direct threats to establish undue influence, or the fact that a joint loan to husband and wife will not of itself put the bank on inquiry of potential undue influence.