White German signal rockets were mistaken for success flares and the 88th Brigade, including the Newfoundland Regiment, advanced from 200 yd (180 m) behind the British front line.

The Ancre river flows west to Hamel then turns south through a valley past Miraumont, Grandcourt, Beaucourt-sur-l'Ancre and St Pierre Divion.

[3] Miners brought from Germany late in 1914 tunnelled under Beaumont-Hamel and the vicinity to excavate shelters for the infantry, against which even heavy artillery could cause little damage.

Three tunnels were dug forward on the 29th Division front and a mine with 40,000 lb (18 long tons; 18 t) was placed under Hawthorn Ridge redoubt opposite Beaumont-Hamel.

After some argument, the timing of the mine detonation was set for ten minutes before zero-hour, to allow the British infantry to occupy the crater before the main attack began at 7:30 a.m.

The barrage had to lift early all along the VIII Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston) front, to avoid hitting the advanced parties at the crater.

[6] Many of the German units on the Somme had been there since 1914 and had made great efforts to fortify the defensive line, particularly with barbed-wire entanglements so that the front trench could be held with fewer troops.

Railways, roads and waterways connected the battlefront to the Ruhr from where material for minierte Stollen (dugouts) 20–30 ft (6.1–9.1 m) underground for 25 men each had been excavated every 50 yd (46 m) and the front had been divided into Sperrfeuerstreifen (barrage sectors).

[7] In 1915, a second position another 3,000 yd (1.7 mi; 2.7 km) back from the strongpoint line (Stützpunktlinie) was begun in February and was nearly complete on the Somme when the battle began.

In April, Falkenhayn had suggested a spoiling attack by the 6th Army but lack of troops and artillery, which were engaged in the offensive at Verdun, made it impractical.

On 6 June, Below reported that an offensive at Fricourt and Gommecourt had been indicated by air reconnaissance and that the south bank had been reinforced by the French, against whom the XVII Corps (Generalleutnants Günther von Pannewitz to 7 September then Paul Fleck) was overstretched, with twelve regiments holding 36 km (22 mi) and no reserves.

More railway activity, fresh digging and camp extensions around Albert, opposite the 2nd Army, was seen by German air observers on 9 and 11 June and spies reported an imminent offensive.

At Verdun on 24 June, Crown Prince Wilhelm was ordered to conserve troops, ammunition and equipment and further restrictions were imposed on 1 July, when two divisions were put under Falkenhayn's control.

[11] The 87th Brigade (Brigadier-General C. H. T. Lucas) of the regular 29th Division attacked on the right, where the edge of Y Ravine was visible but the German wire and front line was mostly out of sight on the far side of a convex (outward curving) slope.

[14] German artillery east of Beaucourt Ridge and heavy batteries beyond had commenced barrage fire (Sperrfeuer) on the British trenches soon after the advance began.

The attack was halted short of the sunken road by German small-arms fire; when soldiers showed themselves, they were shot down and only about fifty men reached the low bank beyond.

German guns had placed a barrage on the British lines as soon as the attack began and the trenches filled with walking wounded and stretcher cases, obstructing the move forward of the 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers and the 16th Middlesex.

The commander assembled the two battalions along the Hamel-Auchonvilliers road because the trenches were blocked, ready to attack on a 1,000 yd (910 m) front, between the right flank and the west end of Y Ravine.

At 10:05 a.m., de Lisle received information about the disaster and he stopped the forward move of any more infantry and brought back the barrage from the fourth objective, at the far side of Beaumont-Hamel valley but only by 300–400 yd (270–370 m) since the positions of British troops were not certain.

[21] Six minutes before zero, the leading battalion of the right-flank brigade moved beyond the British wire and advanced when the new 30,000 lb (13 long tons; 14 t) mine at Hawthorn Crater was blown, passed the east end of Y Ravine and reached the first objective at 6:45 a.m., with a stray party from the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division.

The left-flank brigade was held up in places by uncut wire to the south of Hawthorn Crater and by massed machine-gun fire north of the Auchonvillers–Beaumont-Hamel road.

The front trench was found to be in fairly good repair but constant work was needed to keep it open, particularly in the small salient around Y Ravine, where British guns could bombard it from several directions.

[26] On 12 November, the attack seemed imminent, as the British guns bombarded the front line and the trench garrisons sheltered underground, the air in the dugouts becoming foul.

At dawn the German infantry formed up on dugout steps as they had become accustomed to by the sound of British preparations but the quiet continued and a thick mist rose.

The garrison formed a defensive flank to the right and opened fire, causing many casualties; some British parties turned towards the Germans and were shot down, apparently unaware that the area had not been overrun.

The British barrage had moved forward too far too quickly and the German machine-gunners were able promptly to engage the attackers, who lost so many officers that the survivors became disorganised.

The 88th Brigade was ordered to attack and the lone advance of the 1st Newfoundland after the 1st Essex were delayed by the congestion of dead and dying in the trenches, led to the second worst battalion casualties of the day.

The fog protected the British infantry from German return fire but also made it difficult to keep direction and the mud slowed the advance.

The men of IR 62 were in very poor condition by 13 December, having been in the line since the end of October, in dreadful weather, in positions formerly of high quality but reduced to wreckage by the British preliminary bombardment and the mud.

Everyone had coughs and colds, stomach upsets and increasing thirst and hunger as supply parties found it impossible to move forward or remove casualties.