The wood had dense undergrowth which retarded movement, made it difficult to keep direction and during the battle the trees were brought down by shellfire, becoming entangled with barbed wire and strewn with German and British dead.
The German defenders fought according to a policy of unyielding defence and immediate counter-attack to regain lost ground, intended to delay the Anglo-French advance south of the Albert–Bapaume road and give time for reinforcements sent to the Somme front to arrive.
On 1 July the Anglo-French bombardment on the right flank of the Fourth Army had been highly effective, due to good observation over the German positions and had achieved tactical surprise.
On 1/2 July two German counter-attacks in the early hours were repulsed by shrapnel-fire from the 30th divisional artillery, which also experimented with a Thermite barrage on Bernafay Wood.
[3] A local attack was planned, in support of the French, for the morning of 7 July, on high ground at Maltz Horn Farm and Hardecourt, which overlooked the south end of Trônes Wood.
The attack was postponed, after a German counter-attack on 6 July, recaptured part of Favières Wood further south, which delayed French preparations by 24 hours.
[a] At 9:00 p.m. on 3 July, after a short bombardment, two battalions of the 27th Brigade [9th (Scottish) Division], advanced on a line from the Briqueterie to Montauban and reached the eastern edge by 11:30 p.m., against slight opposition.
[6][b] On 4 July Haig stressed the importance of the rapid capture of Trônes Wood and next day arranged with the French for the right boundary of the Fourth Army to be moved south.
Haig issued a memorandum on policy, that advantage must be taken of German confusion and low morale after the 15 battalions opposite the right flank of the Fourth Army had suffered so many casualties.
[10] No man's land opposite the British was 1,100–1,500 yd (1,000–1,400 m) wide and under German observation but the western approach from Bernafay Wood, held by the 9th (Scottish) Division was not visible form Longueval.
The 18th (Eastern) Division battalions were dispersed around the salient and German bombardments on La Briqueterie, Trônes Wood, Maltz Horn Farm and Maricourt, had cut telephone communication; no time remained to arrange visual signalling or reconnaissance.
Divisions on the Somme front were reorganised into three groups and air units were reinforced and divided into distant and close reconnaissance, artillery observation, fighting and bombing formations.
The troops found that the Germans had been driven out of the trench by the artillery and entered the wood with few casualties, as a company moved from La Briqueterie up a sunken road towards Maltz Horn Farm, to gain touch with the French.
The move was spotted by the observers in British aircraft, from which a bombardment was called down on the east side of Guillemont, pinning down two of the II Battalion companies.
Many of the German posts of Company Von Mosch were overrun and others caught in the worst barrage the troops had experienced, many of the survivors retiring to Guillemont.
By evening the western edge was held by German troops and the reinforcements, most of the south-western corner had been retaken and all of the south, with posts at the fringe and the bulk of the garrison in Central Trench.
A new trench was dug westwards to link with the British troops still in the south-western part of the wood, covered by ambush parties and completed early on 13 July.
[29] Part of Infantry Regiment 178 was to attack Maltz Horn Trench from Arrow Head Copse but the movement of troops near Guillemont was seen at 8:00 p.m. by the crew of a 9 Squadron aircraft, who also saw a German barrage fall between Bernafay and Trônes Wood and called for a counter-barrage.
[30] The German infantry were scattered by the shelling, lost many casualties and the troops moving up for the attack on Maltz Horn Trench failed to reach their front line.
The battalion in the wood attacked north and lost direction again in the undergrowth and tangle of fallen trees, stumbling into the German posts along Central Trench and being engaged at close-range.
At 4:30 a.m., an hour after the main attack (the Battle of Bazentin Ridge) had begun, the leading battalion crossed 1,000 yd (910 m) of open ground in artillery formation through a German barrage, into the south-western side of the wood.
The German redoubt at the south end of Central Trench was enveloped and rushed at 6:00 a.m., then the advance continued and reached the eastern edge, which was again mistaken for the northern point of the wood.
A defensive flank was formed from the railway line, south to the strong point at Trônes Alley; the second battalion entered the wood at 8:00 a.m. and Maxwell went forward and found parties from many units in the south-eastern corner.
German troops pushed north by the advance tried to retreat to Guillemont, covered by four machine-guns at the eastern edge but lost many casualties to British infantry fire from the defensive flank and the strong point, which had been taken at 9:00 a.m.
The German defence from Trônes Wood to La Boisselle had become chaotic, as the British and French exploited the success gained south of the Albert–Bapaume road on 1 July.
The German policy of unyielding defence led to reinforcements being committed piecemeal as soon as they arrived and no reserve to make an organised counter-attack could be accumulated.
Prior and Wilson called this practice as "inept" as British methods, compared to tactical withdrawals to shorten the line and create reserves.
The equivalent British unrelenting attacks, led to poor planning and co-ordination, only succeeding because of the difficulties it imposed on the German defence (sic).
[36] Sheldon wrote that British artillery ammunition consumption would have restricted attacks after 1 July, even if the disaster north of the Albert–Bapaume road had not occurred.
British historians write of the period 2–13 July, as a wasted opportunity, costing 25,000 casualties but not that the Germans had lost the initiative and were constantly off-balance.