[4] The Sheikh Mansur Battalion helped 25 members of the Chechen-led Syrian Islamist group Ajnad al-Kavkaz, including its commander Abdul Hakim al-Shishani, join the fight in Ukraine.
The Separate Special Purpose Battalion, which is part of the Foreign Legion of Ukraine, was formed in July 2022 and claims to be the armed force of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria's government in exile.
On 27 February, the Ukrainian military announced that it had destroyed a large convoy of Chechen special forces gathered near Hostomel, a town in the northwest region of Kyiv Oblast.
[9] Soon after, the Ukrainian military claimed that General Magomed Tushayev, leader of the 141st Motorized Regiment of the Kadyrov Guard, had been killed in action in Ukraine.
[10][11] On 28 February, Kadyrov released a Telegram post saying that "the chosen tactics in Ukraine are too slow," calling for Russian forces to take more aggressive action.
[12] On 1 March, Kadyrov released a further Telegram post saying that two Chechen soldiers had been killed and six injured and saying that the invasion needed "to move on to large-scale measures.
Former US Navy SEAL Chuck Pfarrer believed the claim to be spotty, explaining that the captives appeared to be nearly unscathed and wore outfits which did not match the official Ukrainian marines uniform.
"[25] A number of analysts have stated that the presence of Kadyrovite forces in Ukraine is more focused on creating a psychological effect than on participating in fighting.
[29] Former volunteers in the battalion such as Andrei Panchenko also claimed that people of Chechen and Ingush ethnicity were exempt from performing duties on the front-lines and were separately marked on the military papers.
[31][32][33][34] Russian human rights group Memorial director Aleksandr Cherkasov stated that "Putin started the same way in Chechnya as he has in Ukraine and continues as we move to a new stage of the conflict.
"[35] Tracey German of King's College London wrote that: Putin appears to have anticipated a repeat of Russia's decisive seizure of Crimea in 2014 or its invasion of Georgia in 2008 – but what we have seen is more similar to its intervention in Chechnya in December 1994 when the Russian armed forces were initially unable to convert their military superiority (certainly in terms of numbers) into military and strategic success, and thousands of Russian troops proved unable to secure the North Caucasian republic...