De Bono's advance continued methodically, deliberately, and, to the consternation of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, somewhat slowly.
Increasing pressure from the rest of the world on Mussolini caused him to need quick victories, and he was not prepared to hear of obstacles or delays from De Bono.
Amba Aradam was a steep sided, flat topped mountain directly in the way of an Italian advance on Addis Ababa.
[6] Selassie, who was in Dessie at the time, sent a message via aircraft, ordering Ayalew to halt his attacks along the Setit and to advance with Imru's forces on the Tekezé River.
The Italians observed its direction and attacked it with aircraft, while Imru and Birru took the rest of their men northeast during the nighttime.
[7] Nine miles upstream Birru's advance guard, led by Fitaurari Shifferaw, crossed at Mai Timchet and eliminated a small Italian stone fort before proceeding up the Gondar-Adowa mule track towards the Dembeguina Pass, which was garrisoned by the Italian Gruppo Bande Altopiani, despite orders from Birru not to move past the ford.
[7] The commander of the Gruppo Bande Altopiani, Major Criniti, requested air support from the Italian forces in Axum and bolstered his garrison by deploying a squadron of light tanks.
[7] Watching from the pass, the Italians were alarmed by what they had seen and decided to attempt a break-out through the Ethiopian lines with their nine remaining tanks.
In the ensuing clash Criniti was wounded and two Italian officers were killed before the rest retreated back to the pass.
[10] Completely encircled, the Italians tried to distract the Ethiopians with potential loot by sending their pack mules out of their camp.
The plan failed, and the Ethiopians followed the mules back to the Italian camp, killing the wounded and looting the supplies there.
[10] The combined Ethiopian force then closely pursued the Eritrean troops five miles up the road to Enda Selassie.
At the same time, an Italian Blackshirt paramilitary column of trucks and ten tanks was dispatched from Axum to conduct a counter-attack.
The Ethiopians ambushed the column two or three miles outside of Enda Selassie, blocking its path by rolling boulders across the road.
The Ethiopians claimed to have killed 500 Italian and Eritrean troops, and captured 50 machine guns, much to the pleasure of Imru, since his army possessed none.
The capture of Enda Selassie also gave the Ethiopians a commanding position over the Tekezé fords, and after the battle the remainder of Imru's and Birru's armies hurried across the river.
By the end of the year, it was general knowledge at every marketplace that Ras Desta Damtew was massing an army to invade Italian Somaliland.
[5] The Ethiopian offensive was ultimately stopped due to the Italian forces' superior modern weapons, such as machine guns and heavy artillery.
While the poorly equipped Ethiopians experienced some success against modern weaponry, they did not understand the "terrible rain that burned and killed".
[18] In early January 1936, the Ethiopian forces on the "northern front" were in the hills everywhere overlooking the Italian positions and launching attacks against them on a regular basis.
In response to his frequent exhortations, Badoglio cabled Mussolini: "It has always been my rule to be meticulous in preparation so that I may be swift in action.