Collective intentionality

Prominent philosophers working in the psychological manner are Raimo Tuomela, Kaarlo Miller, John R. Searle, and Michael E. Bratman.

David Velleman is also concerned with how groups are formed, but his account lacks the normative element present in Gilbert.

The notion that collectives are capable of forming intentions can be found, whether implicitly or explicitly, in literature going back thousands of years.

For example, ancient texts such as Plato's Republic[1] discuss the cooperative determination of laws and social order by the group composed of society as a whole.

This theme was later expanded into social contract theory by Enlightenment-era philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes[2] and John Locke.

In contrast, the term Shared intentionality describes unaware processes in mother-child dyads during social learning when very young organisms only manifest simple reflexes and do not possess abstract thinking.

[10] In this paper, Tuomela and Miller assert three conditions necessary for a collective intention, highlighting the importance of beliefs among the agents of the group.

After citing examples that are commonly accepted as requiring more than one member to participate (carrying a table upstairs, playing tennis, toasting to a friend, conversing, etc.

[11] He exemplifies the fundamental distinction between "I-intentions" and "We-intentions" by comparing the hypothetical case of a set of picnickers and a dance troupe.

Searle's rebuttal to Tuomela and Miller's account begins with a counterexample involving a group of business school graduates who intend to pursue their own selfish interests, but believe that by doing so, they will indirectly serve humanity.

However, he claims that collective intentionality does not actually exist in such a situation unless the graduates have organized and formed an explicit pact with one another to serve humanity through self-interested action.

For instance, two individuals who, while sharing the labor of hollandaise-sauce production, each believe the proposition "We are making hollandaise sauce", have formed a collective intention.

With this in mind, he presents three characteristics of shared cooperative activity: One aspect of Bratman's argument that supports these criteria is the idea of meshing subplans.

Bratman argues that even if Alice and Bill do end up painting the house together, they do not have a shared cooperative activity, because their subplans are in conflict.

Alonso attempts to compromise both views by taking a path where joint action is not necessarily a normative or descriptive case.

He argues for a system built off Bratman's that can take place in a descriptive nature addressed by Margaret Gilbert.

[17] For example, Butterfill states that Bratman cannot explain cooperative actions between very young children, who do not yet have an understanding of other minds.

Margaret Gilbert in "Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomena",[19] sets the conditions for people entering, enduring, and exiting acts of collective intentionality.

In her analysis the basic conditions for collective intentions that must be satisfied are as follows: A number of philosophers have responded to the normative theory of Gilbert with papers that consider obligations, promises and commitments.

Specifically, he holds that the behaviors characterizing collective intentionality arise not from a set of mutual obligations which facilitate a "right to rebuke" but from the existence of de facto authority, or some kind of social decision-making process.

This is critical for him to make the case that an agent, having made a decision or an intending speech act, can "remain decided".

[27] They argue that by employing we-reasoning, a team of people can intend and act in rational ways to achieve the outcome they, as a group, desire.