[31] These incidents either lacked supporting evidence or were proven false, and were the result of the Liberal Party attempting to discredit the Labor government, or pro-British politicians and organisations who believed both submarines were inferior to the Vickers Type 2400 offering.

[31] The Dibb Report on the state of the Australian Defence Force was released in March 1986; it included advice that if the submarine project cost increased too much, the boats' capabilities should be scaled back to save money.

[35] The evaluation team recalculated the capability statistics for both submarines to a common baseline, portraying the predicted Australian operating conditions, which generally saw Kockums' figures revised upwards, and those from IKL/HDW downwards.

[35] This resulted in growing support for the Type 471 bid, and outcries from the IKL and HDW groups, which questioned the validity of the recalculations and if the Australian evaluators had the experience to do this correctly.

[37] On 18 May 1987, the Australian Cabinet approved the final design: Kockums' Type 471 submarine, fitted with the Rockwell combat system[15] and Diesel-Electric propulsion units provided by the French engineering firm Jeumont-Schneider.

[39] The Australian Submarine Corporation construction facility was established on previously undeveloped land on the bank of the Port River, at Osborne, South Australia.

[55] Collins was not commissioned into the RAN until 27 July 1996; eighteen months behind schedule, because of several delays and problems, most relating to the provision and installation of the combat data system software.

[61] Following his appointment as Minister for Defence following the 1998 federal election, John Moore decided that the only way to solve the various problems of the Collins class was for an independent report to be prepared on them.

[62] He appointed Malcolm McIntosh, chief executive of the CSIRO and an unofficial advisor to Moore, and John Prescott, a former BHP director, to investigate the project, uncover the problems with the submarines, and suggest ways of solving them.

[71] The ship control system, which during development had been marked as a major potential problem, functioned beyond positive expectation: for example, the autopilot (which aboard Collins was nicknamed 'Sven') was found to be better at maintaining depth during snorting than most helmsmen.

[108] This was compounded by the rate of advancement in computer technology: equipment had to be designed from scratch and custom manufactured at the start of the project, but by the time these were installed, they were obsolete compared to commercially available hardware and software.

[117] Boeing attempted to produce a workable combat system, but believed that this could only be done if the changes in technology were accounted for in a contract alteration, which the RAN and the Australian Government initially refused to do.

[122] Lockheed Martin, Thales, STN Atlas, and Raytheon were approached to provide tenders to design and assemble a new combat system for the submarines, with all four submitting proposals during early 2000.

[135] By 2006, A$5.071 billion had been spent to build the submarines (excluding the fast track program); after taking inflation into account, the project had run less than A$40 million over contract.

[134] When the fast track program is factored in, the Collins class cost just under 20% more than the inflation-adjusted contract value; a smaller increase than other contemporary defence projects.

[60][143] In 2003, the RAN and the United States Navy signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperatively develop the Mark 48 Mod 7 Common Broadband Advanced Sonar System (CBASS) torpedo.

[160][161] During the construction phase, consideration was given to acquiring submarine-launchable Tomahawk cruise missiles; giving the boats the capability to attack land targets after minor modifications.

[165] The Hedemora diesels were chosen because of modular construction, which made servicing easier; they could be installed three across in the available space, while other contenders required at least two banks of two; and they had turbochargers driven by the exhaust gas.

[162][180] The report, publicly released in April 2009, made 29 recommendations to improve conditions and stabilise or increase submariner numbers; all of which the RAN agreed to adopt.

[194] The decision to locate all six submarines at Stirling was prompted by the lack of suitable long-term facilities on the east coast of Australia (although individual submarines can use Fleet Base East in Sydney Harbour as a forward staging facility), and the proximity to Australian offshore interests, including most of the nation's external territories, the oil and natural gas resources of the North West Shelf, and the Indian Ocean sea lines of communication, through which the majority of Australia's seaborne trade passes.

[196] Two boats, including Waller, reportedly operated in support of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999 providing an escort for transport ships and monitored Indonesian communications.

[197] During several multinational exercises and wargames, the Collins class has demonstrated its effectiveness in the hunter-killer role by successfully attacking both surface warships and other submarines.

[200][201] Waller performed similarly during the Operation Tandem Thrust wargames in 2001, when she 'sank' two USN amphibious assault ships in waters just over 70 metres (230 ft) deep, although the submarine was 'destroyed' herself later in the exercise.

[201][202] Later that year, during two weeks of combat trials in August, Sheean demonstrated that the class was comparable in the underwater warfare role to the Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Olympia.

[140] The high-pressure seawater flooded the lower engine room before the hose was sealed off: it was estimated that if the inflow had continued for another twenty seconds, the weight of the water would have prevented Dechaineux from returning to the surface.

[140] On 10 June 2005, Rankin became the first submarine since Orion in 1987 to receive the Gloucester Cup, an award presented to the RAN vessel with the greatest overall efficiency during the previous year.

[180][209][210] Farncomb was docked for repair after a generator malfunction in February 2010, by which point Collins and Waller were active (the former on limited duties because of defects), and Dechaineux was slated to re-enter service by May 2010.

[210] Workforce shortages and malfunctions on other submarines during the preceding two years impacted heavily on the maintenance of Sheean and Rankin, with RAN and ASC officials predicting that they would not be active until 2012 and 2013, respectively.

[219] However, meetings to clarify concepts and intended capabilities did not occur until March 2012, and initial design phase funding was not approved until May 2012, pushing construction start out to 2017.

[223] The best case prediction for seeing the first new submarine enter service, made in 2012, was "after 2030", with the lack of decision making partly attributed to politicians fearing being held responsible for a repeat of the issues surrounding the Collins class.