The provision requires non-union employees a pay "fair share fee" to cover the costs of the union's collective bargaining activities.

Five years later, in Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), the Court held that the Railway Labor Act "denies the authority to a union, over the employee's objection, to spend his money for political causes which he opposes".

In NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), the Court held that agency fees equal to dues are not prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act.

In Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984), the Supreme Court concluded that the agency fee may only cover those activities directly related to the union's role as a collective bargaining representative.

[48][57][58] Beck quit C&PT in 1979 and moved to Oregon, where he worked at CWA-organized job at American Telephone & Telegraph and continued to pay his agency fee.

[48][57][60][61] Beck et al. claimed that CWA had not only breached its duty of fair representation but had also violated the agency fee payers' First Amendment rights as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Railway Employes' Dept.

[35][68][69] The Solicitor General at the time, Charles Fried, argued that the voluntary nature of collective bargaining agreements (including agency fee clauses) made the issue of coercion moot.

[70] Upset by the Justice Department's stand, Republican Senators Jesse Helms, Dan Quayle, Steve Symms, and Strom Thurmond filed an amicus curiae brief urging the Supreme Court to rule in Beck's favor.

[83] For the majority, "The statutory question presented in this case, then, is whether this 'financial core' includes the obligation to support union activities beyond those germane to collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment.

In Detroit Mailers, the NLRB distinguished such assessments from "periodic and uniformly required" dues, which, in its view, a union is not precluded from demanding of nonmembers pursuant to § 8(a)(3).

A number of legal scholars who support the outcome of the ruling nonetheless criticize the Supreme Court's approach to Beck's First Amendment challenge.

The Court and legal scholars point out that labor law is considered unique in the American statutory and constitutional framework, which may mean that traditional First Amendment analyses do not apply.

In doing so, the Court has repeatedly referred to the special nature of labor legislation to explain its unusual deference to a statute so incompatible with judicially developed constitutional norms.

[30] The Supreme Court itself recognized in Abood that implementing its limitations on agency fees would be difficult to administer, and in dicta suggested that further rulings would clarify its thinking.

[116][117][118][119][120] Others conclude that while there may be some infringement on free speech, the voluntary nature of collective bargaining does not raise it to the level of state action under existing Supreme Court doctrine.

Some legal commentators agree, noting that the ruling rejects the Court's well-settled doctrines of statutory construction, which leads to a misinterpretation of Congress' legislative intent.

One legal commentator has concluded that the Supreme Court's duty of fair representation decisions do not lead to the conclusion that agency fees can be restricted solely to collective bargaining purposes.

[130] Another has argued that modern labor unions can only meet their duty to fairly represent workers if they engage in lobbying and legislative activity,[131][132] a conclusion which undercuts the Beck court's decision as well.

[30][98][99][143] The Supreme Court has addressed the agency fee issue six times in the two decades since its holding in Beck,[8] each ruling considering additional union expenditures which may or may not be charged to non-union members.

The case was more difficult to adjudicate because it involved state action (the bargaining unit was composed of public employees) and thus brought First Amendment issues into consideration[49][149] and because of the unique nature of the union's dues structure.

In Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866 (1998), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether non-members must use the union's arbitration process in order to challenge the calculation of agency fees.

A unanimous Supreme Court held in Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33 (1998) that a union did not breach its duty of fair representation by merely including the language of the NLRA, as amended.

[102][173] In 2009, the Supreme Court held in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 07-869 (2009), that a state's refusal to agree to dues checkoff did not abridge a union's First Amendment rights.

[69][177][179][180] The administration also said it would order the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to issue new regulations that would require unions to report in far greater detail the amount of money they spend on political activities, lobbying, and collective bargaining.

In 1989, the National Right to Work Committee polled NLRB offices nationwide, posing as workers and asking about the requirement to pay union dues.

[194][195] In 1992, for only the second time in its history,[181][196][197] the National Labor Relations Board undertook a regulatory rulemaking aimed at resolving the divergent, complex issues raised by the Beck decision.

[30][207] The Board distinguished its holding in California Saw from its prior ruling in Paramax Systems, and found the window period (as well as other restrictions on the submission of resignation and objector status) to be an unfair labor practice.

[239][240] But despite the support of Governor Pete Wilson[225] and a lead of roughly 35 points in the polls in April,[241][242] the initiative went down to defeat 52-to-48 on election day in June after a fierce battle.

[247] By September 2009, only five states had adopted the proposal via initiative or legislation (Idaho, Michigan, Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming), while a sixth (Colorado) had done so via executive order.

[250] At least one legal scholar has questioned the constitutionality of paycheck protection laws,[251] while another, detailed analysis of the Washington state effort has concluded that instead of decreasing the amount of union dues available for political expenditures paycheck protection actually increased it (from approximately $630,000 to approximately $780,000) as unions shifted member dues internally to account for the agency fees going toward collective bargaining.