Coup of Gitarama
The traditional monarchy was led by a Mwami (king), who ruled through an administration of chiefs and subchiefs in the context of a feudal system of patron-client relations based on tribute.
The Mwami and most of his chiefs were members of the Tutsi ethnic minority, a group which wielded considerable social, political economic power.
In 1960 the colonial administration hosted municipal elections which were won by PARMEHUTU, and set up a provisional national government in accordance with the results while barring Mwami Kigeli V Ndahindurwa from the country.
Hutu politicians were infuriated by this decision, and Kayibanda met with Logiest to ask for his support in organising a coup to secure the Hutus' position.
A new government in Belgium was formed in April and it adopted a policy of closer cooperation with the UN to improve its image and attempted to more closely supervise the colonial administration.
In the lead up to Rwanda's legislative elections, political violence killed hundreds of people and led thousands to flee their homes.
The Mwami and most of his chiefs were members of the Tutsi ethnic minority, a group which wielded considerable social, political economic power based on ownership of cattle.
[6] Following World War II, the Ruanda-Urundi mandate became a trust territory subject to the oversight of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.
[7] A small Hutu counter-elite began to form in the post-war era, consisting of persons who had been granted access to education and publications through the Catholic Church.
[8] The new elites began to promote an ideology known as Hutu Power, which challenged Tutsi-minority domination of Ruanda as an exploitation of the majority by foreigners.
[14] Mwami Kigeli V Ndahindurwa, a young monarch who had only inherited the throne in July, sided with the chiefs, troubling relations between UNAR and the administration.
[15] On 1 November nine members of UNAR's youth wing assaulted Dominique Mbonyumutwa, a Hutu subchief who had refused to sign a letter protesting the transfer of the three chiefs.
The Belgian administration struggled at first to contain the disorder, prompting Mwami Kigeli to request permission to raise a militia to put down the brigandage.
On 7 November Kigeli and other Tutsi chiefs went ahead with a campaign of repression, leading to the assassination of 20 PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA leaders—including Gitera's brother, the arrest of hundreds of Hutus, and creation of a militia.
[19] At the same time, Hutu leaders began to reconsider their previous positions of calling for intensive reform in favor of abolition of the monarchy and republicanism.
Tutsi homes were burnt in view of the delegation, leading them to declare in April that Belgian plans for June elections were unworkable.
[29] The Belgian attitude towards UNAR hardened further with the independence of the Congo, as its members forged links with the left-leading Mouvement National Congolais.
Faced with diminishing domestic prospects of success, UNAR petitioned the UN to intervene, requesting that it ensure the repatriation of the Mwami and refugees of the 1959 violence and oversee new elections.
In response, the UN General Assembly issued a resolution on 20 December, calling for the return of Kigeli and the refugees, the institution of a political amnesty, and the postponement of the legislative elections until Ruanda had experienced a process of national reconciliation.
It stated it would abide by the recommendations of the UN General Assembly, whereby elections would be delayed until June, separate referendums would be held on the existence of the monarchy and the issue of independence, and a more broad-based provisional government would be installed.
[35] On 25 January Harroy declared that he was ceding internal autonomy to the provisional government, maintaining that this was necessary to prevent unrest by tempering Hutu disappointment with the postponement of the elections.
[36] According to this account, Kayibanda stated that Hutu leaders were worried about the UN resolutions—which favored the Tutsi leadership—and thus they wanted "to organize a big coup which will convince Usumbura and Brussels that the games are done and for that we need your help.
After the vote split along regional lines for Kayibanda, Gitera, and Balthazar Bicamumpaka, the body selected Mbonyumutwa as a consensus candidate.
[36] Political scientist René Lemarchand wrote in 1970, "Although the evidence is admittedly lacking, there seems little question that the metropolitan government did co-operate on on fairly close basis with the Residency in planning the coup […] if nothing else, the Special Resident must have received unofficial assurance from the Ministry of African Affairs that Brussels would not interfere with the course of action upon which the Hutu leaders were about to embark, no matter how serious the legal implications.
"[36] A telegram from the United States Embassy in Belgium reported "it is apparent [that the] Belgian administration [in] Ruanda (specifically Harroy) undoubtedly connived at January 28 'coup d'état' without consulting Brussels.
[47] On 1 February the Belgian colonial administration announced that, in the interest of avoiding civil disorder, it would give de facto recognition to the new regime.
For their part, the Rwandan leaders never widely published the constitution and continued to accept and implement the colonial administration's legislative decisions.
[50] In the lead up to the September 1961 elections, political violence between PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA, and UNAR members killed hundreds of people and led thousands to flee their homes.
