Culp's Hill
Holding the hill was by itself unimportant because its heavily wooded sides made it unsuitable for artillery placement, but its loss would have been catastrophic to the Union army.
Gen. James S. Wadsworth's division, which had been in the rear guarding the corps trains and was now linked up with the Iron Brigade, digging in following their fierce battle on Seminary Ridge.
His division and corps commanders did not believe they would be stationed at Culp's Hill very long and did not share his enthusiasm for constructing breastworks, but they did not oppose his efforts.
[16] Greene extended his line to the right to cover part of the lower slope, but his 1,400 men would be dangerously overextended if a Confederate attack came.
He sent three brigades (4,700 men) from the division of Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson across Rock Creek and up the eastern slope of Culp's Hill.
Gen. James A. Walker, had been dispatched earlier in the day to screen the Confederate left flank to the east of Rock Creek.
Although Johnson ordered Walker join the dusk assault, he was unable to do so as the Stonewall Brigade sparred with Union cavalry under Brig.
[20] On the Confederate right flank, Jones's brigade of Virginians had the most difficult terrain to cross, the steepest part of Culp's Hill.
The attackers were essentially invisible in the dark except for brief instances when they fired, but the defensive works were impressive, and the 78th and 102nd New York regiments suffered few casualties in a fight that lasted four hours.
[22] Steuart's regiments on the left occupied the empty breastworks on the lower hill and felt their way in the darkness toward Greene's right flank.
Like the fabled 20th Maine of Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain on Little Round Top earlier that afternoon, Col. David Ireland of the 137th New York found himself on the extreme end of the Union army, fending off a strong flanking attack.
Under heavy pressure, the New Yorkers were forced back to occupy a traversing trench that Greene had engineered facing south.
Because of the darkness and Greene's brigade's heroic defense, Steuart's men did not realize that they had almost unlimited access to the main line of communication for the Union army, the Baltimore Pike, only 600 yards to their front.
Ireland and his men prevented a huge disaster from befalling Meade's army, although they never received the publicity that their colleagues from Maine enjoyed.
[24] In the confusion of fighting in the dark, the 1st North Carolina, brought up from the reserves, fired on the Confederate 1st Maryland Battalion by mistake.
)[26] During the heat of the fighting, the sound of battle reached II Corps commander Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock on Cemetery Ridge, who immediately sent additional reserve forces.
[27] By the time the rest of the XII Corps returned late that night, Confederate troops had occupied some of the Union defensive line on the southeastern slope of the hill, near Spangler's Spring.
This caused considerable confusion as the Union troops stumbled in the dark to find enemy soldiers in the positions they had vacated.
Gen. Williams did not want to continue this confused fight, so he ordered his men to occupy the open field in front of the woods and wait for daylight.
Greene repeated a tactic he had used the previous evening: he rotated regiments in and out of the breastworks while they reloaded, enabling them to keep up a high rate of fire.
[33] The 1st Maryland Potomac Home Brigade (despite its name, a regiment of inexperienced recruits) was badly shot up struggling for a stone wall crossing the open field parallel to the line of works.
General Slocum, observing from the distant Powers Hill, believing that the Confederates were faltering, ordered Ruger to retake the works they had captured.
The two regiments selected for the assault, the 2nd Massachusetts and the 27th Indiana, consisted of a total of 650 men against the 1,000 Confederates behind the works with about 100 yards (100 meters) of open field in front.
Alpheus Williams summed up the futility of this fighting: "The wonder is that the rebels persisted so long in an attempt that the first half hour must have told them was useless.
Ironically, he allegedly was carrying a message from another soldier, a boyhood friend and Gettysburg native John Skelly, just deceased, to "Ginnie" Wade, the only civilian killed during the battle.
It was close to the town and, unlike most battles in open fields, it was heavily wooded and the extreme firepower took a very visible toll on the trees, some of which were completely sheared off.
