Davis v. FEC

Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 554 U.S. 724 (2008), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States which held that section 319 (popularly known as the "Millionaire's Amendment") of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (popularly known as the McCain-Feingold law) unconstitutionally infringed on candidates' rights as provided by First Amendment.

Once the OPFA was triggered, the wealthy candidate would still be subject to the contribution limitations imposed by the BCRA and other federal and state laws.

Plaintiff Jack Davis brought suit against the Federal Election Commission, alleging that the BCRA disclosure and limitation restrictions on wealthy candidates violated his First Amendment rights.

Campaign finance limitations not only must equally apply to all candidates, Alito argued from precedent, but they must be narrowly drawn to advance important governmental interests (such as avoiding corruption in the political process).

But Section 319(a) not only did not provide a level playing field, it fundamentally restricted the right of a self-financing candidate to spend his or her own money in a preferred way.

Indeed, the BCRA raises the ominous spectre of the public determining how valuable a wealthy person's speech is, something (Alito said) the Constitution does not permit.

The district court, Stevens said, had found no restriction on the self-financing candidate's ability to spend as much or as little money as he or she pleased.

Because Section 319(a) and 319(b) merely diminished the unequal footing of candidates for federal office, Stevens also found no infringement of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution either.

He found the reporting regulations imposed on wealthy candidates a reasonable limitation which would survive constitutional scrutiny.

Stevens cited several precedents where the Supreme Court had upheld restrictions on wealthy individuals in order to improve the political process.

Citing Buckley v. Valeo and the more recent McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), Stevens said that the Court had condoned legislative solutions which treat candidates differently, and the BCRA did just that.