Death Column
The Death Column (Portuguese: Coluna da Morte) was a military unit in the São Paulo Revolt of 1924, part of the tenentist forces in arms against the president of Brazil, Artur Bernardes.
The column initially had 95 men from the Public Force (the "state army") of São Paulo, growing over time by incorporating civilian volunteers and prisoners.
Loyalists commanded by general Martins Pereira threatened to take Campinas and cut off access to the interior by the rebels in the city of São Paulo.
After the withdrawal of the bulk of the revolutionaries from the capital of São Paulo, on 28 July, the "Death Column" was tasked with defending the rear of the rebels as they traveled along the Sorocabana Railway to the Paraná River.
The column was not destroyed by the final loyalist offensive against Catanduvas on 27 March, and it took part in the revolutionaries' retreat to Paraguay; however, João Cabanas was already too ill to continue and left command, an act execrated by his comrades.
While in exile, he published the book A coluna da morte sob o comando do tenente Cabanas, in which he reacted to the accusations and presented a positive self image of a righteous and revolutionary leader.
The strategy outlined by Euclides Figueiredo, of the cabinet of the Ministry of War, was a loyalist flank movement, advancing through Mogi and Campinas to cut the revolutionary fleeing path.
[8] Upon arriving in Campinas the same day, lieutenant Cabanas was informed that the loyalist vanguard, the 5th BI, under the command of major Amaral, had 800 men in Mogi, Jaguariúna and Itapira.
In Cabanas' account, a small number of Minas Gerais troops in the city was defeated, with four soldiers killed and 16 prisoners, at the cost of two dead and five wounded for the revolutionaries.
São Paulo sources then recorded that a force of 400 loyalists was advancing from the east, coming from Jacutinga; thus, the revolutionary column was threatened on both sides (with Mogi Mirim to the west).
For Paulo René de Andrade, this dispersion of personnel made the 5th BI vulnerable and ineffective, and the continuous movements prevent an accurate picture of events.
[17] From Itapira, João Cabanas ordered the sabotage of tracks and bridges and spread the rumor that he would attack Mogi Mirim from the east, leading general Martins to entrench that direction.
[18] In Mogi Mirim, Cabanas was informed that a thousand loyalists, mainly patriotic volunteers, were grouping in Ribeirão Preto under the command of Public Force lieutenant Inocêncio da Silva.
[c] The revolutionary column withdrew from Pinhal after the battle,[28] heading north to São João da Boa Vista and then returning to Mogi Mirim.
Before he could attempt this plan, Cabanas received a call from Álvaro Ribeiro, appointed by the revolutionaries as the governor of Campinas, informing him of the evacuation of São Paulo by the rebels.
[32][33] On 27 July, the revolutionary high command in São Paulo decided to abandon the city and move all its forces to Mato Grosso, passing through Campinas and Bauru.
At São Manuel, they repulsed an attack by the Malan d'Angrogne column; however, in his account, the loyalist general recorded heavy losses for the revolutionaries (73 prisoners and seven dead).
[36] There was a lack of water and firewood for the trains, and government jagunços took advantage of the dry climate to set fire to the forests on the side of the road, further complicating travel.
[42] Taking advantage of this delay, the loyalists of the Military Circumscription of Mato Grosso reoccupied the ports of Jacaré and Dom Carlos, resulting in the surrender without a fight of the revolutionary 7th Battalion of Caçadores on the 25th.
Shortly afterwards, the loyalists were attacked from three sides (Cabanas from the front, general Bernardo Padilha from the right and major Coriolano de Almeida from the left) and, after three days of firefight, they retreated from Porto Jacaré due to lack of ammunition.
[49] The revolts that started in Rio Grande do Sul in the previous months had ended, but a column of revolutionaries, led by Luís Carlos Prestes, was on its way to Paraná.
The reopening of the path, under torrential rains, crossing swamps with dense vegetation, a terrain with many thorns and four watercourses that required the construction of bridges, was laborious.
In Formigas, the 2nd Battalion of Caçadores, sent by the Santa Catarina Detachment, arrived on 22 January and, by mistake, had a friendly fire incident with the Paraná police, causing five deaths.
Pinned to their trenches by automatic weapons fire at the edge of the forest, the defenders were unable to prevent the loyalists from using another route to reach the rear of Catanduvas.
Cabanas blamed the lack of cavalry support, which should have gone in pursuit, while Prestes accused him of sabotaging his plan, wanting to abandon the fight and, out of vanity, preventing the others from continuing it.
His health had been failing for some time, and he was now unable to walk and suffering from an intermittent fever caused by malaria; he didn't want to introduce himself to his commanders that way.
[74][75] The government press gave expressive negative attention to the column,[76] and still in 1924, after the loyalist victory in São Paulo, Cabanas was the protagonist in the equally derogatory film A metralha nos sertões.
[74] The government's view, recorded in writing by the newspapers and by the police investigation of the revolt, in which Cabanas was convicted, saw him as a truculent military man, marked by violence.
[93][94] Hélio Tenório dos Santos, analyzing the Mogiana campaign, also observed the ability of the Death Column in the war of movement, obeying the principles of mass, information, maneuver and surprise.
[95] According to Paulo René de Andrade, the distribution of police officers from Minas Gerais to various cities, "if it had been determined by the opposing command, perhaps it would not have come out so well and to the satisfaction of the rebels".
