The 1st South African Infantry Brigade made its Western Front début as part of the 9th (Scottish) Division and captured Delville Wood on 15 July.

After the Battle of Bazentin Ridge, the British tried to advance on both flanks to straighten the salient at Delville Wood, to reach good jumping off positions for a general attack.

Falkenhayn ordered a "strict defensive" at Verdun on 12 July and the transfer of more troops and artillery to the Somme front, which was the first strategic success of the Anglo-French offensive.

By the end of July, finding reserves for the German defence of the Somme caused serious difficulties for Falkenhayn, who ordered an attack at Verdun intended to pin down French troops.

[7] The strain on the Germans on the Somme worsened in August; unit histories make frequent reference to high losses and companies being reduced to eighty men before relief.

British attacks in this period have been criticised as uncoordinated, tactically crude and wasteful of manpower, which gave the Germans an opportunity to concentrate their inferior resources on narrow fronts.

[17] Despite considerable debate among German staff officers, Falkenhayn based defensive tactics in 1916 on unyielding defence and prompt counter-attacks, when ground had been lost.

[19] The German front line lay along the old third position, which in this area ran from the southern edge of Bazentin le Grand to the south fringe of Longueval and then curved south-east past Waterlot Farm and Guillemont.

[14][21] A British attack would have to advance uphill from Bernafay and Trônes woods, across terrain with a similar shape to a funnel, broad in the south and narrowing towards Longueval in the north.

[22] The French Sixth Army was pushed back from Biaches south of the Somme by a German counter-attack on 14 July, which was retaken along with Bois Blaise and La Maisonette.

On the north side of the Somme, the Sixth Army advanced by methodical attacks against points of tactical value, to capture the German second position from Cléry to Maurepas.

The infantry moved forward over no man's land to within 500 yd (460 m) of the German front line and attacked after a five-minute hurricane bombardment, which gained a measure of tactical surprise.

Penetrating the German second line by a sudden blow on a limited front was relatively easy but consolidating and extending the breach against alerted defenders was far more difficult.

Brigadier-General Henry Lukin was ordered to take the wood at all costs and that his advance was to proceed, even if the 26th and 27th Brigades had not captured the north end of the village.

At 4:40 p.m. Tanner reported to Lukin that German forces were massing to the north of the wood and he called for reinforcements, as the South Africans had already lost a company from the 2nd (Natal and Free State) Battalion.

Lukin sent messages urging Tanner and the battalion commanders to dig in regardless of fatigue, as heavy artillery fire was expected during the night or early the next morning.

[b] At 12:35 a.m. Lukin was ordered to capture the north-west part of Delville Wood at all costs and then to advance westwards to meet the 27th Brigade, as it attacked north and north–eastwards through Longueval.

By 2:00 p.m., the South African position had become desperate as German attacks were received from the north, north-west and east, after the failure of a second attempt to clear the north-western corner.

Hand-to-hand fighting occurred all over the wood, as the South Africans could no longer hold a consolidated and continuous line, many of them being split into small groups without mutual support.

The Flers road was crossed and a strong point captured and consolidated but then a German counter-attack pushed both battalions back to Pont Street; a second attack was planned and then cancelled.

[49][c] When the bombardment began, about sixty German soldiers surrendered to the 2nd Division and at zero hour, two battalions of the 99th Brigade advanced, with trench-mortar and machine-gun sections in support.

The left-hand battalion crawled forward under the British barrage but as soon as it attacked, massed German small-arms fire forced the troops under cover in shell-holes.

On the east side of the wood, two platoons from the 91st Brigade attacked at 5:00 a.m. but were forced back by small arms fire and at 3:00 p.m. a battalion of the 24th Division managed to bomb a short way down Edge Trench, which was almost invisible after the recent bombardments.

[65] The first attack on Longueval and Delville Wood from 14 to 15 July, was conducted under the observation of 9 Squadron, which directed counter-battery artillery-fire, photographed the area and flew contact-patrols to report the positions of infantry.

[67] During the XV Corps attacks on 24 August, 3 Squadron aircraft brought back detailed information about the progress of the infantry, who had lit many red flares when called on by contact-aircraft.

Parts of the unit began demonstrations and training courses in the new tactics and the 1st and 2nd companies were attached to the Bavarian and Fusilier battalions, which were to retake Delville Wood.

[81] Lukin had wanted to defend Delville Wood with machine-guns and small detachments of infantry but prompt German counter-attacks prevented this; Tanner had needed every man for the defence.

[84] In 2009, J. P. Harris wrote that during the seven weeks' battle for control of Delville Wood, the infantry on both sides endured what appeared to be a bloody and frustrating stalemate, which was even worse for the Germans.

The greater amount of British artillery and ammunition was directed by RFC artillery-observers in aircraft and balloons, which increased the accuracy of fire despite the frequent rain and mist.

On 18 August, a larger British attack by three corps was spoilt by several days of heavy rain, which reduced artillery observation and no ground was gained at Delville Wood.